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No. 74-13
MULLANEY, Warden

v,

Cert to CA 1
~ ~,., ~ ~
(Coffin, Aldrich, McEntee) ~ ¥-- ~

v.

WILBUR

Federal Civil (Habeas)

Timely

~

The State of Maine seeks review of a CA 1 decision affirming
a decision by USDC (Gignoux) granting a writ of habeas corpus.
Respondent's murder conviction was vacated because the federal

-

--

- - --

---- - -

courts viewed Maine's "presumption of malice" in "felonious
,-----......_

•

-

.

homicide" cases to be a violation of due process under Winship.
FACTS:

Respondent was convicted of the murder of Claude Hebert.

In pretrial statements respondent admitted inflicting severe

'

- 2 -

(

injuries upon Hebert (which caused his death), but claimed he
had killed in the heat of passion sudd~nly provoked by Hebert's
homosexual advances; respondent did not testify at trial.

The

court instructed the jury:
"In all cases where the unlawful killing is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, ana "wnere mere is notfilng in the circumstances of the case to explain, qualify, or palliate the
action, the~
r~
i .t_.__!:~_!l_ave beell_~O.!_l e ~i _th malice
a ~ g _h...t_. Ana if the accused, t at is the defendant,
would reduce the crime below the degree of murder, the
burden is upon him to rebut the inference which the law
raises from the act of killing, by evidence in defense."
It is again, [sic, not?] I must say, that he must call
witnesses to the stand in defense. But it means that from
all the evidence in the case he must be able to satisfy you
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that . • • although
he killed, and although he killed unlawfully, if such is the
case, he killed in . the heat of passion upon sudden provocation,
as I shall explain hereafter. And if such were your findings,
then the respondent, the defendant, would be . • • guilty of
manslaughter and not murder.
[473 F.2d 943, 944]

c___

Although respondent did not object to the charge at trial, on

-----

dir_~ct appeal the Supreme Judicial Co1::.:.:._~f Maine considered

----- -

his challenge to the malice presumption.

--

Since respondent was

tried in 1966, the court declined to anticipate that Winship

.

1/

would be held retroactive.-

More fundamentally, the court

concluded that Winship did not govern the presumption of malice.
Although separate Maine statutes have defined murder and manslaughter since the inception of its statehood, the court looked
to early Maine decisions that had spoken of murder and manslaughter
as "degrees" within the crime of "felonious homicide."
Conley, 39 Me. 78 (1854).

State v.

Under this ·theory, malice was not an

essential element of the crime of "felonious homicide" but rather
a factor that went to the level of punishment (as murder or man1/ The Maine court was incorrect in its prophecy.
City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972).

Ivan V. v.

~;
//.

,,~'

.\
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slaughter).

The Maine court added that the presumption rested

upon sound public policy since it would be quite difficult as
a practical matter for the state to negate a "suggestion" of
sudden provocation and heat of passion beyond a reasonable
doubt.

278 A.2d 139.

Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
USDC.

Reading the murder and manslaughter statutes separately,

------

__-

USDC concluded that they defined two separate and distinct crimes.
Since malice aforethought is the element distinguishing murder
________,__
from manslaughter, malice is undeniably an essential element of

---

-

--------------- --- --- --

-

-----

------- -

-

-- -

- --------

the crime of murder, and Winship requires that it be proved by

--

-

the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

-----

~

the conviction and sentence.

The court vacated

349 F.Supp. 154.

On appeal, CA 1

accused the Maine court of linguistic gymnastics, questioning
the ,. integrity of the sudden "new interpretation" of the murder
and manslaughter statutes.
"unacceptable".

CA 1 found the state court's analysis

Although it noted that other jurisdictions per-

mit the jury to infer malice aforethought f r om the evidence presented, it found Maine's presumption of malice violative of
Winship.

473 F.2d at 947-48; see also 349 F.Supp at 153, n.4.

In a final observation, the panel expressed doubt that "a
formula which imposed on the defendant a factual issue determinative of the length of sentence would be any more acceptable
than when used to establish an element of the crime."

473 F.2d

at 948.
The state sought certiorari.

While its petition was pending,

t:he Supreme Judicial Court of Maine again entered the fray.

In

- 4 -

State v. Lafferty, 309 A.Zd 647 (1973), the court angrily pointed

-----------

out that "a Federal court has no right to reject the rational

interpretations given a state law under those circumstances by
........

"--

-- - --

........_

-.....

the highest appellate court of that state."
[emphasis in original].

~

/

309 A.Zd at 662

The court reaffirmed its interpretation

of murder and manslaughter as •~

of "felonious homicide"

and rejected the suggestion that Winship requires the state to
negate beyond a reasonable doubt "all mitigating circumstances"
going (not to guilt or innocent) to punishment.

The state

the Lafferty decision to the attention of this Court which then
granted cert:torari, m

----------

ated the decision of CA 1, and remanded

-- -

the case for further consideration in light of Lafferty. 414
- u. s.
1139

C

-(1974).

-

----- --

Not to be foiled, CA 1 responded with a deft parry and a
lightning thrust.

Softly conceding that it erred in originally

focusing on the structure of Maine law, the panel now took as a
given that there is a single crime, "unlawful (felonious) homicide."

But CA 1 rejected the state's contention that since malice

went not to criminality but rather to a level of blameworthiness
this matter fell outside Winship.

Going beyond the state's

characterization of its malice presumption as procedural, CA 1
looked to the substance of the di fferent consequences attaching
to a defendant convicted of felonious homicide depending on the
degree.

----

The court focused principally on disparate sentences
.

----,.

(nomin al fine to seventeen years for manslaughter, life imprison-

(_

______________________

....
ment for murder), and concluded that the Maine presumption was

,,.

unconstitutional under Winship.

CA 1 added that a rule allowing

.
- 5 -

(:

a jury to drm,.r inferences from the evidence was not objectionable,
even if in practical effect it may require a defendant to coille
forward with evidence (Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837).
Therefore, permissive infer ences, as contrasted with mandatory
presumptions, remain unaffected by the CA 1 decision.
CONTENTIONS:

Maine contends that CA 1 erroneously extended

Winship to reach factors bearing on mitigation of punishment
and not on criminality.

Interestingly, Maine does not advance

the argument that the presumption, even if within the reach of
Winship, is valid under this court's criminal statutory presumption
'!:_/
cases.
DISCUSSION:

t

.

This issue is also before the Court in Burko v.

Maryland, No. 73-6761, Summer List 6, page 3, in which a con(

viction was upheld despite a Winship challenge.

The ultimate

holding by CA 1, rejecting the mandatory presumption but reaffirming the propriety of permissive inferences, is narrow and within
the reasoning of Winship although it does re_p resent an extension
•

I o~ Winship bey on~
397 U.S. 358, 364.

,I

the _ fact [ s] neces".":~

-

____

_)

o constitute the crime."

Should the Court wish to decide this issue,

the present case would be more suitable than Burko (which presents
additional issues).

There is a response (noting that three states

in post-Winship decisions have held similar presumptions unconstitutional).

-

9/10/74

Nannes

-

Opn in Ptn App

2/ Both USDC and CA 1 found that the presumption could not stand
under Leary and Turner. 349 F.Supp. at 153-54; 473 F.2d at 947-48.
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MULLANEY

Motion of Respondent
for Leave to Proceed
!:•,; Fg_rma P§:._~pE:!_riJ; and
for the Appointment of Counsel

v.

~~
~
WILBUR
~/

IMMEDIATE SITUATION: On October 15, the Court granted cert to CA 1 to
review the granting of a writ of habeas corpus to resp.

Resp now seeks an order

permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis and appointing Peter J. Rubin, Esq.
as counsel to represent him in this Court.
CONTENTIONS OF RES P : Resp was incarcerated in 1966 pursuant to his conviction for murder.
employed.

He was released on bail this past summer and became gainfully

His current net salary is $86 per week.

Resp avers that he has no sav ing s

account nor does he own any personal or real property of substantial value.

- 2 -

..

Ir:

\

Resp does not indicate the duration of Mr. Rubin1 s service to him as counsel.
Mr. Rubin is a member of the Supreme Court bar.
DISCUSSION: It may be noted that counsel's expenses in this case probably fall
under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 ( see, 39 Comp. Gen. 133; Rule 53( 8) ).
11 /14/74
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein

DATE:

January 4, 1975

No. 73-14 Mullaney v. Wilbur
This case involves the constitutionality of requiring
a defendant to prove that he acted in "the heat of passion"
or "with provocation" in order to reduce murder to manslaughter.
On

its face Maine law is similar to the common law which

distinguishes murder from manslaughter by the element of
malice aforethought - i.e. a cruel and ~~~W\4) heart.
Traditionally malice aforethought is negated by showing that
a defendant acted in passion or upon provocation.
The trial court in respondent's case instructed the
jury that malice aforethought should be presumed from the
commission of a voluntary homicide.

The defendant was then

required to negate malice by proving that he acted in the
heat of passion or with provocation.

The Maine Supreme

Court held that malice aforethought was not a "fact" necessary
to show murder but rather a description of those who commit
such a crime.

The court also held that manslaughter and murder

were not different crimes
crime.

but rather degrees of the same

Thus, requiring the defendant to prove passion or

provocation only involved proof of a mitigating factor, not
, an exculpatory factor and therefore Winship was inapplicable.

2.
The federal district court granted respondent's petition
for habeas, holding that Winship required the state to prove
malice aforethought since it was the distinguishing factor
between murder and manslaughter.

CAl affirmed, concluding,

in the face of the Maine Supreme Court's decision, that under
Maine law malice aforethought was essential to the crime of
murder and that murder and manslaughter were two distinct
crimes.
of

This Court granted cert and remanded to CAl in light

l),e,,~

~eftcfa:t'"

intervening decisions of the Maine Supreme Court

arguing that CAl should have considered itself bound by the
Maine court's interpretation of Maine law.

CAl then held

that, even under the Maine Supreme Court's interpretation of
the state's homicide law, Winship required the state to prove
the lack of passion or provocation.
1.
Maine

Respondent again urges this Court to reject the
Supreme Court's

interpretation of its own law.

I can understand why he does so because the Maine Supreme
Court has clearly run through some verbal gynmastics by
reading malice aforethought out of its homicide statute in
order to avoid Winship.

Nevertheless I think this Court should

make clear that Maine's interpretation of its substantive law*
J

*Some cases have suggested that a State interpretation of
its procedural rules is not always binding. E.g., Boliie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347.

3.

is controlling, even if it is irrational, unless that
'

'---

interpretation offends the Constitution.

Although this

would appear obvious, apparently the question has generated
some confusion (certainly in CA 1), and this Court has
failed to rule definitively on it.

See Comment, Due Process

and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule:

The

Remains of Federalism After Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 Me. L.
Rev. 37 (1974).

This is an interesting area and in many

ways the most important issue in the case.
2.

Even assuming that Maine's interpretation of

its law is controlling, the issue on the merits in this
case is close.

rationales for ~
acceptable.

=

I think there are two potentially reasonable
ins ip,

both approaches are

My own preference, as I will explain, is for

the second approach.
A.

The literal formula constitutionalized in

Winship was proof of "every fact necessary to constitute
the crime charged."

One approach to implementation of this

formula is to allow the state to define the elements of
(or facts necessary to constitute) a crime.

Such an approach

mirrors, to some degree, the Court's analysis of due process
entitlement cases.
The sole limitation on the states under this
approach would be a sort of substantive due process
limitation as to what behavior it may designate as criminal.

4.

For exa1J1.ple, a st_a te ~obviously Anot say that all
homicides are murder and therefore that all it need prove
to satisfy the constitution is that the defendant killed
~

the victim.

y(.-

Cf. Mo~ssette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246.

Similarly, I think at least an arguable due process question
is presented by a statute eliminating the issue of insanity
from the criminal law.
In the present case I do not think that the due process
clause would be offended if malice aforethought were excluded
from the crime of murder or felonious homicide so long as a

s·

reasonable element of intent - such a Maine has - remains.
A

Thus, within these bounds, Maine would be free to define its
criminal law and Winship would not apply to the burden of
proof of passion or provocation since under state law these
factors go only to mitigation of punishment.
B.

A second approach to Winship is to ignore the

state's definition

necessary to co stitu~e .J.._
1 ~ W ~ 6_ i ~ 1.Uh.e.tA..
factor is determ

a crime."

-

fact, manner, or duration of confinement it must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Winship, itself, is consistent

with this approach since in that case the Court ignored New
York law insofar as it defined

delinquency as a non-crime.

I prefer this approach because, without it,
by engaging in semantic gamesmanship,
the purpose of Winship.

a 0tnt;e

6...

7 {,__-k__

can frustrate

For example, first and second

5.

degree murder in most states are clearly degree s of the
same crime, and under the Maine Supreme Court's rationale
in this case, a state could say that a defendant must
prove that he did not deliberate and premeditate in order
to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder
since all that is at issue is punishment.

Similarly, under

the approach of the Maine Supreme Court, if a state defines
murder as a single crime but punishes it by death if the
defendant acted with specific intent, but only by life
imprisornnent if the defendant acted with a general intent,
the state could require the defendant to prove that he acted
only with a general intent.

Again, under this approach,

the state could define all assaults as a single offense
with different degrees (and different punishments) depending
on the defendant's intent - i.~., intent to kill, to connnit
robbery, to connnit rape, etc. - and require the defendant
to show that he had only an intent to assault and nothing
more.
Although these hypotheticals are perhaps a bit
extreme I do not think that they are much different from
trying to say that manslaughter and murder are the identical
crime and the distinction between them goes only to the
penalty.

The distinction goes to intent and if intent is to

6.

remain a vital element of the criminal law, and in
my view it should, then I think when the State requires
a different intent for different crimes, different degrees
of a crime, or different punishments, it should bear the
burden of proof under Winship.

3.

J:~)

Consistent with the approach ehp..rge there is

a way to ease the burden on the state somewhat.

~

If the

lack of passion is an element of murder~the state must
prove it in all cases, even when the defendant does not
contest it.

This can lead to some unnecessary effort.

Thus, one accomodation would be to adopt the approach
to the insanity defense in federal court:

The defendant

has the burden of raising and going forward on the insanity
issue, but then the state must prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469.
In short, the burden of proof would always be an issue of
constitutional dimension while the burden of going forward
would not be such an issue.
Upon rereading this memo, I find that it may be a bit
cryptic.

I would appreciate the opportunity to spell out my

view if you have the time.

J.K.

7Ju..Wa.-r~ (~~
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January 20, 1975

Re:

Mullaney v. Wilbur - No. 74-13

Dear Chief:
At Conference Friday I voted to affirm in this case,
announcing my disagreement with Harry's observation that
we ought not to rest on the jury instruction.
I have
since had opportunity to reflect: and after reading what
we said last Term i n ~ v. Naughten about taking jury
instructions as a whole, I find myself now in agreement
with Harry on this point. For me this change of heart
brings me all the way over to the "reverse", column
where I guess I am now a minority of one.
Sincerely,

:1., 7/1/
; v

•

The Chief Justice

J

'

• I

cc:

The Conference

.

I

MEMORANDUM

TO:

:Mr. Joel Klein

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

February 24, 1975

No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur
I spent most of Sunday reviewing your draft of 2/20/75,
with great interest.
The draft is thorough, scholarly and - in my view sound.

It was fascinating reading.

As you will observe, my editorial changes are not
substantive.
I have only one reservation:

Parts I and II seem too

long, and occasionally a little repetitive.

Yet, I did not

have an opportunity to review the draft again with this
thought in mind.

Accordingly, I am not able to make a

specific suggestion as to condensation or elimination.
I appreciate that nruch of the problem in Part I derives from
the "yo-yo" history of this case.

Also, you expanded this

part to meet my concern as to the possible confusion arising
from the first drafto
In any event, there is no rush to circulate this - as
we have a week before the new assignments.

Accordingly,

take such time as you wish to edit and polish the opinion
with the view to putting it in the best possible shape.
•

In this process, bear in mind the appearance of over-length

and some repetition.

Also, you might ask David to make

2.
suggestions in this respect.
Congratulations on a fine piece of work.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

~u:p:r.mtt <!):amt 4tf tlft ~t~ ~tai:tg
~a,glpngfott, :!9. C!):. 2llffe'!,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 10, 1975

No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

.Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,,•

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Joel Klein

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DA'l'E:

February 24, 1975

No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur

. .
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I spent most of Sunday reviewing your draft of 2/20/75,
with great interest.
The draft is thorough, scholarly and - in my view sound.

It was fascinating reading.

As you will observe, my editorial changes are not
substantive.
I have only one reservation:

Parts I and II seem too

long, and occasionally a little repetitive.

Yet, I did not

have an opportunity to review the draft again with this
thought in mind.

Accordingly, I am not 1a:N<e to make a

specific suggestion as to condensation or elimination.
I appreciate thatrJmU'C1!n of the problem in Part I derives from
the "yo-yo" history of this case.

Also, you expanded this

part to meet my concern as to the possible confusion arising
from the first draft.
In any event, there is no rush to circulate this - as
we have a week before the new assignments.

Accordingly,

take such time as you wish to edit and polish the opinion
with the view to putting it in the best possible shape.
In this process, bear in mind the appearance of over-length
and some repetition.

Also, you might ask David to make
,,·

,.

2.
suggestions in this respect.
Congratulations on a fine piece of work.
L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein

DATE:

April 10, 1975

Here are the points that I would rely on in distinguishing
Leland from Mullaney:
1.

The historical development regarding heat of passion

has clearly been toward rejecting the original York case which
required the defendant to prove this element.

At present only

about six states place this burden on the defendant.

In

contrast, there has been no such historical development with
regard to the insanity defense.

Indeed fully half the states

place the burden on the defendant.
2. The Winship interests of stigma, and ·most important,
liberty, are affected far differently in an insanity case.
The stigma attaching to one found not guilty by reason of
insanity may be as great as that attaching to a person
convicted for the charged offense.

Moreover, the deprivation

of liberty, in practical terms, resulting from a not guilty
by reason of insanity verdict may be far greater than the
deprivation of liberty resulting from conviction.
Court' s opinion in Lynch v.
3.

0 \1-eA

See this

~

Requiring the prosecution to negate heat of passion

is not a unique burden since that element is an objective
element of intent, traditionally proved by adducing testimony

.

.

-

2.
regarding the factual circumstances of a homicide.

An

insanity plea, by contrast, uniquely turns on the defendant's
subjective state of mind.

Indeed, without the defendant's

cooperation it is often difficult if not impossible for the
state to rebut a plea of insanity.

J.K.
ss

Supreme Court of the United State.s
Memorandum

______ JumL.6 ___________________ , 197-5___ _
MISS SMITH
Sally-- This is the one I spoke
to you about yesterday. Since the
lineup form differs from the one
sent to me you might wish to check
with the Justice to make certain
that the present form is OK.

Thank.,
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MEMORANDUM TO PRI NT SHOP
'.

Re:

Tentative Syllabus for:
No. 74-13, Mullaney v. Wilbur

,.

Attached is a tentat i ve syllabus for the above
case, to be set up in page proof, four (4) copies of
which are to be returned to me as soon as poss i ble.
It is important that this matter be given priority so
that no delay will ensue at such time as the opinion
is ready for release.
Should there be any subsequent changes in the draft
syllabus, you will be advised.
If the lineup o f Justices is not already included
in the enclosed draft, the author of the opinion or I
will send it to you for insertion directly below the
syllabus.
The final syllabus (wi th the decision dat e inserted and the lineup included) is to be stapled on
top of the opin i on and released for distribution with
the opinion when you receive instructions to release
the opinion.
~

ely,

, :;J:lt; Putzel, jr.
Reporter of Decisions
Attachment

..

~

MULLANEY v. WILBUR

L------1

I:.

MULLANEY et al. v. WILBUR
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit
No. 74-13.

Argued January 15, 1975--Decided

The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder,
which upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment, to prove that he acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation in order to reduce the homicide to
manslaughter, in which case the punishment is a fine or
imprisonment not exceeding 20 years.

Held: The Maine rule

does not comport with the requirement of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary
to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U. S.
-.-,

358~ -aHd

to

~~

-

-

Lvh

,vi....,

meet that requirement the prosecut0,,1: o:f a

homicide case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
when the issue is properly presented. Pp. 8-20.
496 F. 2d 1303, affirmed.

1c "'r
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I Page

proof of syllabus as
approved.
Lineup included.
Lineup still to be
added. Plea;;e send
lineup to Print Shop
d
when :1Vailablc an
a copy to me.

I
I

-

II -

NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time
the opinion is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
oo., 200 u.s. 321, 337.

I
I

I

~UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ I'fnot:;tz~~g::vaas fa:;f.;vfJ°ft
0

v
-

Syllabus

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOI1
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 74-13. Argued January 15, 1975-Decided June 9, 1975
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder, which
upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment,
to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden p~ovocatiori
in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, in which case the
punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years.
1Ield: The Maine rule does not comport with the requirement of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U. S.
358. To satisfy that requirement the prosecution in a homicid~
case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue 1s
properly presented. Pp. 8-20.
496 F. 2d 1303, affirmed.

(

PowELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
QUIST,

J., filed a concurring opinion, in which

BURGER,

showLineup, which has now
been added.
Additional changes
in sylbbus.

-

MULLANEY ET AL. v. WILBUR

C.

REHN-

r, joined,
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of

'

-

HmrnY PUTZEL, jr.
Reporter of Dcci;;ions.
-·-·-•····'-•·•-----·--·--

lfp/ss

6/6/75

74-13

Mullaney v. Wilbur

This case comes to us from the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.

Petitioners are the State of Maine

and the Maire State Prison Warden.

Respondent was

convicted of murder under a Maine procedure that placed
the burden on him to prove that he had acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation.

Only if he carried

this burden could he reduce murder to manslaughter.
After exhausting his state remedies, respondent
filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court
challenging the Maine procedure.
For the reasons stated in our opinion, we hold that
the challenged procedure is a denial of due process.

We

follow this Court's decision in In Re Winship which requires
the prosecution in a criminal case to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist has filed a concurring opinion
in which the Chief Justice has joined.

June 10, 1975
i,,

\

...

,1

Cases Held for No. 74-13 MULLANEY v. WILBUR

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
1.

No. 73-6761

Burko v. Maryland.

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder.
He seeks a writ of certiorari. His primary contention
__ is that the trial court committed constitutional error
when, over petitioner's objection, it instructed the
jury pursuant to settled state law that
If you should find that there was an
unlawful homicide, then the burden rests
upon the defendant not to satisfy you
beyond a reasonable doubt but to a fair ·
preponderance of the evidence that the
killing happened under certain circumstances
[.!.e., without malice] to reduce the homicide
' [from second degree murder] to mans laughter.
It would appear that petitioner's claim is meritorious
under Mullaney. Since it is difficult to ascertain the
precise contours of Maryland homicide law, I would suggest
vacating tha judgm.ent of the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals and remanding for further consideration in light
of Mullaney.

,,
I
)
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Petitioner also raises two additional claims:
(1) that a Maryland statute providing that "(i]n the
trial of all criminal e4ses, the jury shall be the Judges

,."...

.

,

'

2.
of Law, as well as of fact" is a denial of due process
and equal protection; and (2) that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain a conviction for second degree
murder. In my view neither of these issues merits review
by us.

.

,•
'

.

;·

2.

No. 74-5632

Castro v. Regan.

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder.
After exhausting state remedies he unsuccessfully sought
federal habeas relief. His sole claim is that the court
coamitted constitutional error in the following instruction:
''The law presumes that all unlawful
homicides, that is all unlawful killings,
are committed with malice unless the lack
of malice is affirmatively demonstrated by
the evidence.

,

•

·,

_,

"And so, since I've told you that the
' legislature has divided the crime of murder
into two degrees, that is first and second
degree, we note again the presumption that
every unlawful killing of a hum.an being is
murder in the second degree."
Respondent concedes that in vacuo this instruction
might be considered erroneous. -ifut he argues that, taken
as a whole, the instructions made clear that the prosecution
was required to prove malice. Respondent points to the
trial court's general instructions regarding the state's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant's presum.ption of innocence.
I am inclined to vacate and remand on the basis
of Mullane
Although the instruction in this case is
an aberrat on in New Jersey>l am not pers,J&ded that the
error was cured by the court's general instructions on
the presumption of innocence and on the prosecution's
general burden of proof by a reasonable doubt.

1.
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3.

3.

No. 74-532

McKinney v. Alabama.

Petitioner was convicted of selling obscene
literature pursuant to a state statute that forbids
the sale of material previously adjudged obscene in
an equitable proceeding. Petitioner was not a party
to the equitable proceeding at which the state
established obscenity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Petitioner was then notified that the material he was
selling specifically had been declared obscene, but
he persisted in his sale nonetheless. At his trial the
only issue for the jury was whether petitioner sold the
material, not whether the material was in fact obscene.
Petitioner claims that reliance on the prior equitable
decree to establish obscenity violated his right to a
jury trial, his right to confront his accusers and his
due process right to have the state prove all facts
necessary to constitute the crime by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected
. these contentions by a 5-4 vote.
I do not think Mullaney has a significant bearing
on this case. One could suggest, as do the dissenters
below, that by allowing a conviction based on a prior
determination in which the state was only required to
establish obscenity by a preponderance of the evidence
allows for circumvention of Winship.
But the court
below considered the basic Winship claim and rejected
it on the ground that the offense for which petitioner
was convicted was selling material previously declared
obscene and not selling obscene material. I doubt
Mullaney adds anything to this specific question.

...

,..~. ;

~-

.... ,,

The general issue presented by this case is whether,
consistent with the First Amendment and general notions
of due process, a state can predicate an obscenity
conviction on a prior determination of obscenity at
which the defendant was not a party and at which the
state need establish obscenity only by a preponderance.

·'',.

,.

•

4.

If the Court is interested in this issue the case should
be granted, limited to Question 2 in the petition. (The
remainder of the petition raises general Miller-type
questions which we denied in companion cases, Nos. 74-536
and 74-537).
The issue is certainly not a frivolous one.
I would like to hear it discussed before voting on the
petition.

L.F.P., Jr.
LFP/gg
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CHAMBERS OF

March 10, .1975

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

✓

Re: No. 74-13 -- Garrell S. Mullaney et al. v.
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr.

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

;;1/trT.M.

•.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

..
' J.

.§ttptmtt {!fau:rt llf
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CHAMBERS OF

March l 0, 1975

.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN , .JR.

RE: No. 74-13 Mullaney v. Wilbur
',

Dear Lewis:
I agree .

Sincerely,

1M
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

(!fltttrl ltf tltt ~ttitt~ .itattg
Jhudp:ngfott. ~. (If. 2Dffe~,

~tmt

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

March 10, 1975

Re:

No. 74-13

-

Mullaney v. Wilbur

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

/

j,u;vrtmt (!Jcurt cf tqt ~ttittb j,tattg
Jfa.slp:ttgtcn. ~. (!J. 2'llffeJl.$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 13, 1975

Re:

No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

;r~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

•~

.iu.prtntt C!fMtrt of tlrt 'Jnitt~ ,ifattg

:.raslti:nght~ J. C!f. 2llffe"~
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 22, 1975
PERSONAL

Re:

74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur

Dear Lewis:
My "hangup" in this case arises out of the fact that inevitably it
will operate to undermine Leland v. Oregon. The major vice that produced disaster for a number of years under the Durham rule in the
CADC derived from the Davis cases in 1897 under which (in federal
court) as soon as any evidence of mental disturbance appeared, the
burden shifted to the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the defendant had no mental disease. That imposed a functionally
impossible burden to prove a negative, which as Earl Warren said in
the Kennedy Assassination Report is a virtual impossibility. To prove
a negative beyond reasonable doubt is a total impossibility.
It is for this reason that Leland is a large factor in the whole
enforcement of criminal law even though it rarely need be cited. An
affirmative defense ought not be subject to a requirement that the
prosecution negate it beyond a reasonable doubt. It simply can't be
done. Only the good sense of juries has saved us from the consequences
of a good deal of judicial folly, like Durham, in this area of proof burden.
Even at that, hosts of plainly guilty got verdicts of not guilty by reason
of insanity, and went to St. Elizabeth's for a few months and were out
on the street again.

You indicated that you intended no denigration of Leland. (That
means you lack mens ~ ! So your "offense" can be only manslaughter
of Leland but murder or manslaughter kills with equal finality ! I)
The 11 defense" of insanity is, as of now at least, not a mitigating
factor since it does not open the way for a verdict on a lesser included
offense, but for an entirely non-criminal verdict. The prosecution
should not rationally be required to negate that or any other 11 yes but 11
or affirmative defenses - - that is for the defendant who asserts the claim.

- 2 -

If you really do not wish to "do in" the Leland rule, I'd like to
discuss this further.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell

~-

,,..

April 23, 1975

~

\

'...
"··

),-

No. 74-13 !-t&llaney v.
Dear Chief: -Thank you for yours of April 22. ·
I was aware, in writing the above case, of the Leland
problem. In view of divergent views among members of the
Court, it seemed prudent to steer a middle course and avoid
' reference to Leland.
My own view is that Leland is distinguishable from
Mullang. The historical development of the two lines of
cases
s been quite different. The State of Maine is one
of the few states that has adhered to the original~
case (decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in 1845). Although initially followed, the trend for many
years has been away from York. Indeed, Massachusetts itself
has abandoned York, and I-ai'rnk only some half-dozen states
continue to place on the defendant the burden of proving
"heat of passion on sudden provocation". In contrast, there
bas been no such historical development or trend with respect
to the defense of insanity. Although I have not made a
·
"head count", bly understanding is that at least half of the
states place the insanity burden on the defendant.

.
'

Moreover, there are significant differences in the
nature of these two affirmative defenses. Requiring the
prosecution to negate "heat of passion" will not normally
be a difficult burden for the state to carry since that
element is usually susceptible of proof from the circumstances of the homicide. For example, in Fowler (argued
Monday) the state would have had no difficulty proving

,.
·,

,.

.....,
'

,.

,.
,·'' ./'
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absence of heat of passion (had the defense been raised)
from the circumstances in which Fowler - long after his fight
with Griffin - drove to Griffin's residence and gunned him
down in the presence of his two small children. It would,
however, have ·been more difficult for the state to carry the
burden of proving Fowler's insanity. One's mental condition
often is entirely sub~ective and also can be feigned. Indeed,
without the defendants cooperation - e.g., submitting
honestly to psychiatric examinations - it may be difficult
if not impossible in some cases for the state to rebut a
plea of insanity. I must say, however, that my observation
has been that few juries pay much attention to an insanity
defense.
,·

In sum, I do not consider that my opinion in Mullaney
forecloses a different decision if Leland should be
reexamined by this Court. I tried to write Mullaney strictly
in accord with the Conference vote which was, as I understood
it, that Winship foreshadowed and controlled our decision
here.
Sincerely,

lfp'ss

~UFmtt (!f"1trl .of tqt~a ~taftg

,ras4tttghtn. ~. <!f.

2llffe'!,

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 14, 1975
PERSONAL

Re: No. 74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur

Dear Lewis:
I have not had a chance to discuss your April 23 response to
my memorandum. I have not persuaded you that your opinion, as it
stands, is the demise of Leland. I lived with this problem for 13 years
and Leland 1 s interaction with the Davis cases is the crucial factor. That
we do not see this in the same light is suggested by your comment that
11
£ew juries pay much attention to an insanity defense. 11 Possibly so in
Virginia, but not everywhere, and surely not true at all in federal courts
bound by Davis. If Leland goes, the Davis rule of burden of proof will
be the law, and there is the risk that the D. C. Circuit 1 s nightmare with
Durham could be repeated. Happily, Durham is dead, buried and unmourned, but literally dozens of cases each year went for defendants
under it, and they were out of St. Elizabeth's after a brief sojourn - with few exceptions.
I1d like to go over this with you and I wish, at this hard time
of the year, I had the 11 gall" to ask you to read the attached.
(/ Regards,

~(3
Mr. Justice Powell

~ 1¥:m.t- <!f ourl of t!rt ~ h ~htltslying-f.ttn. ~. <q. 21Jffe.ll,~

~,u;

,·
CHAMB E AS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 5, 1975

Re:

74-13 - Mullaney v. Wilbur

Dear Bill:
Please show me as joining your concurrence.
Regards,

Mr. Justice

Rehnquis{)f1

rs

Copies to the Conference

.

~.,

June 5, 1975

•·

No. 74-13

Mullaney v. Wilbur

Putzel:
The line-up in the above case is as follows:

Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court
in which Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marsh.all and
Blackmun, J.J., joined.

Rehnquist, J., filed a concurring
C. J. , joined.

Sincerely,

Mr. Henry Putzel,
lfp/ss
Mr. Cornio
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

'•

No. 74--13
Garrell S. Mullaney
et al., Petitioners,

v.
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

[March -, 1975]
MR . .TusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule comports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re
Winship, 397 U. S. 3.58, 364 (1970), that the prosecution
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged.

I
ln June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E.
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him
rested on his own pretrial statement and on cireumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's statement, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had
attacked Hebert m a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homo~
sexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respondent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's
counsel asserted that at most the homicide was ID!l,11- .

.

'

'

,.
.

74-1:t--OPINtON
MULLANEY v. WILBUR

slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the
heat of passion provoked by thP. homosexual assault.
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not subdivided into different degrees. The common elements
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionatz
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between
murder and manslaughter.
In view of the evidence, the trial court drew particular
attention to the difference between murder and manslaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of
both offenses," the court charged that malice aforethought
"was an essential and indispensable element of the crime
of murder," App., at 40, without which the homicide
would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed,.

·C

..

'•

,.

1

Ai:, examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court mentioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38.
2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the·
jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he
mtended an act which was calculated and should have been understood by a person of reason to be one likely to do great bodily harm
and that death resulted." App., at 37.
3 The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 2651,.
provides:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought
either express or implied is guilty of murder and i:,hall pe punished
by imprisonment for life."
The manslaughter statute, Tit. 17, § '..S51, in relevant part
provides .
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of pas,;ion,
on imdden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished by 11 fine of not more than $1,000
or by imprisonment for. not more than 20 years, , • !•

~

..... ,,
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3

however, that if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought
and heat of passion on sudden provocation are inconsistent things," App., at 62; thus; by proving the latter the
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then concluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 0
After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury twice
returned to request further instruction. It first sought
4
The trial court also explained the concept of express malice aforethought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of human life which
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally bent on mischief." App., at 40, 41. Despite this instruct:on, the court repeatedly made clear that expres1:1 malice need not be established since
malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice
appears to have been wholly unnece~ary, as the Maine Supreme
.Tudicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(1972). See also n. 10, infra.
, "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the act the
reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might
[make] ordinary men of fair, average dispositiim liable to act irrationally without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion
rather than judgment." App., at 47.
8
"Heat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation .
Sudden means happening without previous notiee or with very brief
notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for . . . It
is not every provocation, it is not. every rage of passion that wilt
reduce a killing from murder to manslaught<>r. The provocation
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing,
that, for a moment a person could be-that for a moment the
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own
1.tndersianding." App., at 47,

,.
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reinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice aforethought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion."
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found
respondent guilty of murder.
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, arguing that he had been denied due proces~ because he was required to n0gate the element of malice
aforethought by proviug that he had acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential
element of the crjme of µrnrder-indeed that it was the
sole element distinguis~ing murder from manslaughter.
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's decision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Maine Judicial Court rejected this contention,1
holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are not
distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the single
generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur,
278 A. 2d 139 (1971). The court further stated
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that
the prosecution could rest on the presumption of implied
malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove
that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's
trial, 8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the application of the Winship pri~ciple to a "reductive factorn
1 Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions a,t trial.
The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d,
at 144.
8 The Maine
court concluded that Winship should not be
applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, however, that Win..ship should be 11:1ven complete retroactive effect , Ivan v. City of
New York, 407 ll. S. 20a (1972).

..
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such as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id.,
at 146.
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus ln federal district court. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court ruled
that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter
are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a
single offense. The court further held that "[m] alice
aforethought is made the distinguishing el~ment of the
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153.
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the
prosecution to prove maliQe aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he
acted m the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
The Court of Appeals for the Fitst Circuit affirmed,
subscribing in general to the District Court's analysis
and construction of Maine law. Wilbur v. Mullaney,
473 F. 2d 943 (1973). Although recognizing that "within
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion
of constitutional due process is a federal matter.'' Id., at
!'14,:,;. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought
with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that
Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
( 1973), m which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's
view that it was entitled to make an independent determination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are punishment categories of the single offensf'_ of felonious homi~

;'
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cide. Accordingly, if the presecution proves a felonious
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in
order to receive the lesser penalty prescribed for
manslaughter.11
ln view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari
in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 414 U. S. 1139· ( 1974). On
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the
"substance" of that law, the court found that the presence
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
resulted in significant differences in the penalties and
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
again granted certiorari. 419 U. S. (1974). We now

··~

.

·.

affirm.

II
We reject at t.he outset respondent's position that we
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur1J The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to the view of the
Court of Appeals for the First Circmt, malice aforethought connote:;
no 8Ubstantive fact (such as pr<'meditation), but rather is solely a
pohcy presumptiou. Under its rnterpretatiou of state law, the Marne
court would require proof of the same elemen1 of mtent for bot,h
murder and manslaughter, the distmction beiug that m the latter
ca:se the intent results from a sudden provocation which lead:; the
defendant to act in the heat of passion. 309 A. 2d, at 670-671
( concur.ring opinion),

'·
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der and manslaughter are distinct 9rimes in Maine, and
that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it
marks a radical departure from prior law,1° leads to internally inconsistent . results, and is a transparent effort
to circumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memp~is, 87 U. S. 590
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and
that we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances riot present here. 11 Accordingly,
<

.1

Respondent relies on Boyie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347
(1964). In that case, a State Supretpe Court's reinterpretation of
a criminal statute was so novel as to be "u.nforesee.able" imd therefore deprived the defendant;, of fair notice of the tJossible criminality
of _their acts at the time they were committed. Thu;;, the retroactive
application of the new interpretation was it~elf a denial of due
process. See also BrinA:erhoff-Faris 'Prust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281
U. S. 6n ( 1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes,
Respondent's Brief, at 12, there was no comparable prejudice to
respondent. since in Maine the burden .of proving heat of passion
has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See,
e. g., State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78, 90--91 (18.54). To be sure, the
trial court instructed the jury on the concept of expre..,,s malice
aforethought, Hee n. 4, wpm, a concept, that was subsequently
stripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. But,
the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need
not, be ~hown since malice would be implied from t,he unlawful homicide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v.
Nau.ghte11., 414 U . S. 141, l49 (1974), we di:;cern no prejudice to
re:;pondent .
·
11 On rare occasions the Court has re-examined a state court inter~
pretation of state law when it appeur:; to be an "obvious subterfuge
to evade consideration of u federal issue." Radio St1ttior,. WOW v.
John1sun, 326 U. S. 120, lW (1945). See Ward v. Love Co., 253
tr. R. 17 (1920); Terre l-Ja,ute & Ill. R.R. v. lndia.na ex rel. Ketchmn,
194 U.S. 479 (1904) . In thi:; cu.-,e, the Maine court's interpretation
10
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of state homicide law,

ITI
The Maine la\, of homicide, as it bears 011 this case,
can be stated succwctly: Abst>nt ,1ustification or excuse,
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as rnurdeti. e., by life imprisonment-uuless the defendant -proves
by a fair preponderance of the evide11ce that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation,
in wluch case it is punished as mans]aughter-f. e., by
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due
process.
A
Our ana]ysis may be illuminated 1f this issue is placed
in historical coutext. 12 At early common law only those
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and
were punished by death. Gradually, however, the severity of the common-Jaw punishment for homicide abated.
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justifiable homicides expanded to include, for example, accidental homicides and thost> committed in self-defense.
of ::;tate law, ev1•11 a~,;ummg it to be novel, doe:, not fn1,;trate cou,n<lnation of 1hP due proep::;:,; i~8UP, a~ the Mmne court it~Plf recognized, State v. Wilbur. 2i~ A. :M, at 14U, and as the remam<ler of
llw, op1111011 mak<.,, elt>ar. S<'<> geuerally Comment. Due Proce::;rs ,11111
~upremacy as Foundation:< for thP Adequacy Rule: The Remain:, of
Ft·derali,;m \fter Wilbw· \". Wullcmey. 2!i Me. L. Rev :37 (1974) .
1~ \Tuch of tlui,- lu;;tor;\ w:1~ :wt out m thl' Court's opm1on in
\1cGautJw v. California. 402 P S. lH:3 ,. Ul7-198 (1971). See al,;o
;{ St<'phen, A Hi~tory of .the Cnmmal Law of E:11gland 1-108 (1~83);;
2 Pollock t\;: 1laitland, Hi~torv of Engli~h Law 478-487 (1895}.
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Concurreutly, tµe widespread use of capital punishment
was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligible for "benefit of clergy,"· a procedural device that
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who cominitted an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th
century, English ruler~, concerned with the accretion of
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular,
enacted a series of statutes eliminating the benefit of
clergy in all cases, of "murder of malice prepensed." 18
Homicides that were committed without such malice
were designated "manslaughter" and their perpetrators
rentained eligible for the .benefit of clergy.
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for
all secular · offenses the distinction between murder and
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter
(when voluntary) 14 arises from the sudden heat of passions, murder from the wickedness of heart." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 190. Malice aforethought was
designated as the element that distinguished the two
crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be
implu•d by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent
proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden
and sufficient violent provocation," the homicide waf:l
13 12 Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496,; 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512); 23 Hen,
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547) .
14

Black:,.tone also referred to a class of homocides called involuntary manslaughter. Such hom1c1des were committed by accident in
the t·our~e ot perpetrating another unlawful, although not feloniou~,
,act. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 191-192. This offense, with
somP modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in
Lhl::, country. See Perkins On Criminal Law 70--78 (24 Eq, 1969),

'
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"presumed to be malicious." u Id., at 199, 201. In view
of this presumption, the early English authorities, relying
on the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB
1727), held that once the prosecution proved an unlawful
homicide, it was "incumbent on the prisoner to make
out ... all ... circumstances of justification, excuse or
alleviation ... to the satisfa~ti,on of the court and jury."
4 Blackstone's Commentaries 201. See Foster, Crown
Law 255 (1762). Thus, at common law the burden of
proving heat of passion on sudden provocation appears
to have rested on the accused. 16
In this country the concept of malice a~orethought
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it
came to signify a substantive ~lement of intent, in the
nature of express malice aforethought, requiring the
prosecution to prove that the defendant intended. to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm; in other j uri:;;dic tions it
remained a policy presumption, identical to the concept of :implied malice aforethought, indicating only that
absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See 8tate v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me.1972). See generally
Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforetlllOught
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden prnvoca-tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect,
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally·
Note, The Con8titutioqality of the Common Law Pr(!sumpti on of
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986---999 (1974) .
16
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: Burden of Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 808, 904---907 (1968), a:rgues
that the reliance on Onerby's case was misplaced. In Onerb1i' thejury returned a special vndict making specific findings of fact. No·
finding was made with respect to provocation. Absent 'such a rinding the court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher main-tams that in the context of a special verdict it it> impossible to determine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his bmden of g1, ing
forward with "some evidence" or the t1ltimate burden of persuading;
the jury. Cf. n. 31, infra;,
15
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Perkins: A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
Yal'e L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934). 11 In a landmark case, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) 93
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to negate malice aforethought by proving that he
acted in the heat of passion. 18 Initially, York was adopted
in several other jurisdictions, 10 including Maine. 20 In
1895, however, in the cont~xt of deciding a question of
federal criminal procedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469. 21
Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees,
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37
Col. L. Rev. 701, 707-709 (1937). Maine initially adopted the distinction between degrees of murder, requiring proof of express malice
to establish first-degree murder and considering implied malice to be
sufficient for second-degree murder. See State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78
(1854); State v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564, 575 (1870) (opinion of
Kent, J .) . The State subsequently discarded the different degrees of
murder, and provided that either expressed or implied malice aforethought sufficed to establish murder. See, e. g., State v. Merry,
8 A. 2d 143 (1939).
18 Justice
Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth
wall required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, including malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate
the suggestion that ·the killing occured in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. He also rejected t he doctrine of implied
malice on the ground that " [n]o malice can be inferred from the
mere act of 'killing .' Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and
unfom:ded." 50 Mass., at 128 ,
i1J See cases cited m Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79.
20 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1854).
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court declined
to apply the specific holding of Davis---"that the prosecution must
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt-to the States.
17
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And, in the past half century, the large majority of States
have abandoned York and now require the prosecution to
prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave &
A. Austin, Criminal Law 539-540 (1972).z2
This historical review establishes two important points.
First, the fact at issue here--the presence or absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been,
almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; H. Packer,
The Limits of the Criminal SanP-tion 138-139 (1968).

B
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations
Winship should not be extended to the present case.
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact
necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to petitioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were essential to establish criminality in the first instance
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play
until the jury already has determined that the defendant
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter.
22 See also State v. Cnevas, 480 P . 2d 322 (Hawaii 1971) (Winship
requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a
reasonable doubt). England also now requires the prosecution to
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mancini v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1942 Ap.
Cas 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1935 Ap"
Cas 462.
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In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of
paramount concern. since, irrespective of the presence or
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation, he
is likely to .lose his liberty and certain to be stigmatized. 28 In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those
facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the
defendant
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law
of Maine, li]_{e that of other jurisdictions, is concerned
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Because the former are les~ "blameworthy," State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 ( concurring opinion), they
are subject to distinctly less severe penalties. By
drawing this distinction, while refusing to :require the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable. doubt the
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests
found critical in TVinship.
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have
28 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 196 (1973), petitioners seek

to buttress this contention by arguing that since the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the
tmditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not subject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker·,
404 U.S. 443 (1972) . There is no incompatibility between our decision today and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bodies,
Undel Maine law, the Jury 1s given no discretion as to the sentell.CQ
to be imposed on one found ~uilty of felonious homicide. If the·
drfendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence results. On the other hand, if the jury finds him guilty only of maw,:;laughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise of its
discretion to llllllose a sentence within the statutorily defined limits.
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been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared wi~h a verdict
of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when
viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions
of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the distinction established by Maine between murder and man:.
slaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could
undermine many of the interests that decision sought to
proteot without effecting any substantive change in its
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear only on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this approach can be fashioned from the
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into three distinct punishment categories-murder, vo].untarymanslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter. O:rily the ·first two of these
categories require that the homicidal act either be intentional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670--671 ( concurring opinion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not.
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide.
Petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were a,ccepted, Maine could impose a.
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that
traditionally might be considered involuntary mansl:.iughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his·
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless. 2 •
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Many States impose different statutory sentences on different.
degreES of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition
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Winship is concerned with substance rather than this
kind of fonnalism. 26 The rationale of that case requires
an 1:1,nalysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the
law as applied and enforced by the state," St. Louis S. W.
R. Co. ex rel. Norwood v. Arka~qs, 235 U. S. 350, 362
( 1914), and to the interests of both the State and the
defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of
proof.
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26
"The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procequre
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and bec~use of the
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction.
o.

"Moreover, use of the reasonab1e-doubt standard
is ind'ispen~able to co.rnm&nd. the respect and confidence of the cemmllnity in appPications of the criminal law. It is critiear that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the·
elements of aggravation-e. g,, intent to kill or intent to rob.
But, see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d' 523' (Me. 1969) (prosecution
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt) .
25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency·
was not formally considered ;.. "crime" under state law. 397 U. S,.
at 365-366; id ., at 368 (Harlan, J., concurring).
2.11 See also Lego v. . Tworney,. 404 lL. S . 47:7., 486i (.19'Z2) ~
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that leaves. people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364.

···,l

,.

These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this
case than they were in Wiriship itself. Petitioner there
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible
extension of an additional four and one-half years, 397
U. S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant
and the community's confidence in the administration of
the criminal law are also of grea~er consequence in this
case, 27 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in
Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting).
Not only are the interests underlying Winship implicated to a greater degree in this case, but the protection
afforded those interests is less here than it was in Winship. There the ultimate burden of persuasion rema,ined
with the prosecution, although the standard had been re-duced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. In doing·
so, Maine has increased further the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such a result directly cou-travenes the principle articulated in Speiser v. Randall;
357 u. s. 513, 525--526 (1958):
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by·
See Duncan v. Loui.suma, 391 U. S. 154, 160 (1968):
The penalty authoriz<'d by the Jaw of thr locality may be taken
'as a gauge of its social and ethiral Judgments ' " Quoting District,;,
Q[ Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U, S.. 617, 628 (1937} ,
~7
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the process of placing on the [prosecution] the
burden ... of persuading the factfinder ...."
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring),
C
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145,
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument
that th·~ homicide was committed in the heat of passion
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defend~nt. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prosecution to satisfy. The same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the traditional burden which our system of criminal justice
deems essential.
Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself acknowledged that most States require the prosecution to
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146. 28 Moreover, the difficulty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation 1s similar to proving any other element of
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the
homicide. And although intent is typically considered
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
218 See p. 12, supra.
See also Note, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1937) .
Many States do reqmre the defendant to show that there is "some evidence" indicating that he arted m the heat of passion before requiring the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of
passion beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & A. Austin,
supra, at 539. Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that.
requirement. Sre also n. 30, infra.
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this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify
shifting the burden to him. Ser Tot v. United States,
319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 39·5
6, 45 (1969).
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique
in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 211 Maine itself
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. }1Iillet,
273 A. 2d 504 ( 1971). "0 Satisfying this burden imposes
an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to
the burden involved in negating the heat of passio11 on
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hat·dship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical
to criminal culpability.31

u. s.

Ser grnerally F. Wharton, A Trratise on the Law of Evidence
§ 320 (1894); Model Penal Code § 1.13, Commcn1t at HO (Tent,
Draf1 No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 883 & n. 14.
1" In Millet the Mame Suprrme .Judicial Cou:-t adopted the "majority rnle" regarding proof of 1:,elf-defemm. 'fh0 burden of producing "some evidence" on tin~ is1:,ue re1:,t;; with the drfendant, but
the ultimate burde.n of per8uas10n by proof beyond a reaHonable
doubt remains 011 the prosecution.
a, This concl11s1on is supported by consideration of a relatPd lin~ of
ca:<e~. Traditionally, the burden of proof is divided into a burden
of i;oing forward with some evidence and au ultimatr burden of
prr~ua:-non. Sre, "· g., McCormick, Evidence § 336 (2d ed. 1072).
ln this opinion we havr dealt only w1tl1 the burden of persuasion.
In ,·r11n111al ca,<{'~ generally thr proserntion bears both burdens.
ln "ome 111:,;tanc~:-;. howl'wr, the pro,,;ecutiou is aided by a pre:,;umptiou, 1<Pe Davis v. United States_, HiO lJ. S. 4tl9 (1895) (presumption
of •lJJit~ ) , or a pnm1osil,le inference, :<ee United States v. Gainey,
J~O {j. 8. G;i ( 19fi5) (infPrt'nce of knowledge from J>re:,;ence at an
.ill('gal ~t,11). St'e al1:,o Barnes \ Untted .States, 412 lJ. S. 8:{i, 846 n.
H (l~i;J l. Fsl' of the8c proePdnral device~ is subject to due procesS<
lirmtations precisdy because tlwy requm· (in the case of a pre-smnption) or permit (in the ca't' of a11 inference) the trier of fact
,Cl couchuk that thr pro:-ecutiou ha::: nwt itK burden of proof with
2 1<
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V
Maine la"' requires a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372
( concurring opinion). We therefore hold that the Uue
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on
sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented
in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is

Affirmed,

re~p(•ct to the pre~umed or inferred fact Ly having satisfactorily
cbtahli~hed other fo ct~.
In each of these cases, the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof
bPyond a reasonable doubt remained on the prosecution. See, e. g.,
Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S., at 645 n. 9; Davis v. United States,
160 U. S., at 484-488. Shifting the burden of persuasion to the de-,
fendant obviously place~ nn rven greater strain upon him since he
no longer need only raise a reasonable doubt with respect to the fact
at ,~sue ; he mus1 affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly,
tlw Due Procf':,s Cfause demands more exacting standards before
the State may requirr a d(-'fendnnt to bear this ultimate burden of
persuasion . See gcm•rally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, A:l1:mmption~ and Dne ProceBs m Criminal Cases: A Theoretica.l Over~
view, 79 Yalr L . ,I, Hi.'i (1969).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-13
Garrell S. Mullaney
et al., Petitioners,

v.
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

[March -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule comports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged.

.

.

.. .
,

I
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E.
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him
rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's statement, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had
attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homosexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respondent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's
counsel asserted that at most the homicide was man-

. ,.
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slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the
heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault.
The trial com-t instructed the jury that Maine
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not subdivided into different degrees. The common elements
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionat2
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between
murder and manslaughter.
In view of the evidence, the trial court drew particular
attention to the difference between murder and manslaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of
both offenses,3 the court charged that "malice aforethought
is an essential and indispensable element of the crime
of murder," App., at 40, without which the homicide
would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed,
1

As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court mentioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38.
2
The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the
jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he
intended an act which wa;; calculated and should have been understood by [a] person of rPa:::on to be> one likely to do great bodily harm
and that death resulted." App., at 37.
3 The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev . Stat., Tit. 17, § 2651,
provides:
"Whoever unlawfulJ:v kills a human being with malice aforethought,
Pither express or implied, it; guilty of murdrr and shall be punished
by imprisonment for life "
The man~lau~htcr ~tatute, Tit. li § 2551, in rrlevant part
provide~:
" Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion.,
on sudden provocat1on, without exprc:,s or implied malice afore.
thought . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.
or by 1mprisonm1-'11t for not more than 20 years . . • ."

'
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however, that if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought
and heat of passion 0~1 sudden provocation are inconsist~
ent things," App., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then con_cluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 0
After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury twice
returned to request further instruction. It first sought

,.
'·

4
The trial court also explained the concept of express malice aforethought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of hurru1n life which
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fa.tally bent on mischief." App., at 40, 41. Despite this instruction, the court repeatedly made clear that express malice need not be established since
.malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice
appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. La,fferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(Hl73). See also n. 10, infra
5 "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the a ct the
rrason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irratiomilly without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion
rather than judgment." App., at 47.
6
"[HJ eat of pa ssion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation.
Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief
notice ; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for . . . . It
is not every provocation, it is not every rage of passion that will
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing,
that for a moment a person could be-that for a moment th~
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own
1
'l.mderstancling." App ., at 47--48.

,,
,.
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reinstruction on the doctrine· of implied malice afore~
thought, and later .on the definition of "heat of passion."
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found
respondent guilty of murder.
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, arguing that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the element of malice
aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential
element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the
sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter.
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's decision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Maine Judicial Court rejected this contention,1
holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are not
distinct crimes but rather different degrees 0f the single
generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur,
278 A. 2d 139 ( 1971). The court further stated
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that
the prosecution could rest on the presumption of implied
malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove
that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's
trial,8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the application of the Winship principle to a "reductive factor"
'1 Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial.
The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d,
at 144.
8
The Maine court concluded that Winship should not be
applied rc-troactively. We subsequently deci<,led, however, that Win,ship should be given complete ret,roactive effect. Ivan v. City of
New York~ 407 U.S. 20:3 (1072) .

', '
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such as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id.,
at 144--146.
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court ruled
that under the Maine sta.tutes murder and manslaughter
are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a
single offense. The court further held that "[m] alice
aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153.
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the
prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed,
subscribing in general to the District Court's analysis
and construction of Maine law. Wilbur v. Mullaney,
473 F. 2d 943 (1973). Although recognizing that "within
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion
of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at
945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought
with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that
Wtnship requires the prosecution to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(1973), in which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's
view that it was entitled to make an independent determinat,ion of M aine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are punishment categories of the si~1gle offense of felonious homi-

''
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cide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a felonious
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in
order to receive the lesser penalty prescribed for
manslaughter .9
In view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari
in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 414 U. S. 1139 (1974). On
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the
"substance" of that law, the court found that the presence
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
resulted in significant differences in the penalties and
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable donbt that the
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now
affirm.

..

.•.

II
We reject at the outset respondent's position that we
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur1l The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to t,lie view of the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforethought connotes
no subshmtive fact (such as premeditation), but rather is solely a
policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine
court would require proof oi the ::;ame element of intent for· both
murder and mam;laughter, the distinction being that in the latter
case the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the
defendant to act in the heat of passion. aoo A. 2d, at 670-67ll.
(coucti_rdng opinion)1 ,

•.
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der and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and
that malice aforethought is a fact essenti&l to the former
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it
marks a radical departure from prior law, 10 leads to internally inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort
to drcumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 590
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and
that we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances not present here. 11 Accordingly,
Re:,;pondcnt relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347
In that case, a State Supreme Court'8 reinterpretation of
a criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and therefore deprived the defendants of fair notice of the possible criminality
of thrir acts at the time they were committed. Tlms, the retroactive
application of the new interpretation was itself a denial of due
process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281
U. S. 673 (1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes,
Rf'::1pondrnt'::; Brief, at 12, there was no comparablr prejudice to
respondent, since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion
has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See,
e (I., State v. Knight, 43 Mr. 11 1:37-13R (1857). To be stm, the
trial court instructf'd the jury on the concept of express malice
·1foretho11ght, see n. 4, supra, a concept that was subsequently
stripped of its vitality by th<.> Maine Supreme Judirial Court. But
the trial court explicitly stated that exprcs::1 malice aforrthought need
not be shown ,;ince maJice would be implied from the unlawful homi~
cidc. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v.
Naughten, 41411. S. 141,149 (Hlia), we dio('cm no prej udice lo
r<·~pon<lent.
11 On rare occa8ion8 the Court has re-examined a ~tate court inter•
prctahon of state law when it appear:,; to be an "obvious subterfuge
1o evade consideration of a frderal i:s~m· ." Radio 8tation WOW, Inc .
v Johnson , :3213 U. S. 120 129 (1945). See Word 1. Love Co., 253 U.S.
17 (1920); Terre llaute ,~ ind. R. R . 1· . Indiana ex rrl. Ketchum,
11)4 r, S. 579 (1904). In tln:;. ea,;,e, the J\lainr rc,urt's i11terpretntl01i
10

(1964).
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of state homicide law.

III
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case,
can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse,
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murderi. e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was com~
mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation,
in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i. e., by
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due
process.
A
Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue is placed
in historical context.12 At early common law only those
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and
were punished by death. Gradually, however, the sever•
ity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated.
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justi•
fiable homicides expanded to include, for example, accidental homicides and those committed in self-defense,

,,,

r

•,;r

'

;

of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate consideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recognized, State v. Wilbur, 2i8 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of
this opinion make,; clear. See genemlly Comment., Due Process and
Supremacy H::i Foundation,; for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of
Federalism After "Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974).
12 Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 197-198 (1971). See also
:3 Stephen, A Hi.;tory of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883);
2 Pollock & .:VIaitland, History of English La}V 4i8-487 (2d Ed. 1909).

t''

, 4-tg---6P!NiON
MULLANEY v. WILBUR

9

Concurrently, the widespread use of capital punishment
was ameliorated further by l:lxtension of the ecclesiastic
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligible for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb bral)ded and
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th
century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular,
enacted a sei'ies of statutes eliminating the benefit of
clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 18
Homicides that were committed without such malice
were designated "manslaughter" and their perpetrators
remained eligible for the benefit of clergy.
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for
all secular offenses the distinction between murder and
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter
(when voluntary) 11 arises from the sudden heat of passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 190. Malice aforethought was
designated as the element that distinguished the two
crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be
implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent
proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden
and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide was
13

12 Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496) ; 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512 ) ; 23 Hen.

VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531) ; 1 Edw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547) .
11

Blacbtone also referred to a clas,, of homicides called involun...
t ary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in
the course of perpetrating another unlawful , although not felonious,
.act. 4 Blackstone's Commenta n es 192-193. This offense, with
some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized m
thi;,_ country. See Pnkins On Crimmal Law 70-77 (2 Ed , i 969).

-.
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"presumed to be malicious." 1 " Id., at 201. In view of
this presumption, the early English authorities, relying
011 the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB
1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the
accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent /
on the prisoner to make out ... all ... circumstances of
justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction
of the court and jury." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries
201. See Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at common law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden
provoca.tion appears to have rested on the defendant.16
In this country the concept of malice aforethought
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it
came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring ~
the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions
it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that ~
absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me. 1972). See generally
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provoca.
tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect,
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally
Note, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986-999 (1974).
16
Fletcher, Two Kings of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Ca~es, 77 Yale L . .J. 880,
904-~07 (1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance
on Onerby's case was misplaced. In Onerby the jury returned a
special verdict making specific findings of fact. No finding was
made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the
court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains
that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to deter.
mine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of going
forward with "some evidence" or the ultimate burden of persuading
ihe jury. See also n. 19, infra,.
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Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934). 11 In a landmark case, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) .93
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to negate malice aforethought by proving by a pre- ,
ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of
passion. 18 Initially, Yark was adopted in several other
jurisdictions, 10 including Maine. 20 In 1895, however, in
u Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees,
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 JJ_ A__
Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937).
a::.e.K£l..o...
18 Justice
Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth
was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, including malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate
the suggestion that the killing occured in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. He also rejected the doctrine of implied
malice on the ground that "[n] o malice can be inferred from the
mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and
unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128.
19 See casf'S cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79.
Some
confusion developed, however, as to precisely what Yor~ re4uired.
Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof"
into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular
bsue and a burden of persuading the fact finder with respect to that
issue by a standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or bj·
a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., McCormick, Evidenre § 336 (2d ed. 1972). This d1stinrhon apparently was not
well recognized at the time York was decided, and thus in some'
jurisdict10ns it was unclear whether the defendant was required to
bear the product10n burden or the persuasion burden on the 1s;:;ue
of the heat of pas~ion . See, e. (J ., cases discussed in People v. Morrin ,
31 l\.lieh . App . 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971).
Indeed, 10 years !.fter the decision in York, Chief Justice Shaw
explained that "the doctrine of York's cm;e was that where the killing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing

[Footnote 20 i,~ on p. 12]
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the context of deciding a question of federal criminal pro~
cedure., this Court explicitly considered and unanimously
rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis
v. United States, 160 U. S. 469. 21 And, in the past half
century, the la.r~e majority of States have abandoned
York and now require the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond
a reasonable doubt. See La:Fave & Austin, Criminal Law
539-540 (1972). 22
This historical review establishes two important points.
.First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been,
fu,rther is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious
and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (69
Mass.) 463, 465 (1855) (emphasis in original). He further noted
that thi8 presumption did not govern when there was evidence
indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion.
In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with
malice, they will retnrn a verdict of murder; otherwise they will find
the defendant guilty of m,rnslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus, even
the author of York quickly limited its scope to require only that
the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is,
that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other
jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by
requiring the defendant to prove "to the satisfaction of the jury"
that he aC' ted in the heat of pasEion . See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63
N. C. 26 (1868).
20 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1.857) .
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court declined
to apply the specific holding of Davis-that the prosecution must
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt--to the States.
22
See also State v. Cuevas, 480 P. 2d 322 (Hawaii 1971) (Winship
requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a
reasonable doubt). England also now requires the prosecution to,
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt . Mancini v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1942 Ap.
Cas. 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions., 1935 Ap ..
Cas. 462.
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almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; Packer,
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968) .

B
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations
Winship should not be extended to the present case.
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact
necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to petitioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were essential to establish criminality in the first instance
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play
until the jury already has determined that the defendant
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter.
In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of
paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation, he
is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigmatized. n In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those
28 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949). and
McGuutha v California, 402 U . S. 183, 196 (1971), petitwners seek
to buttress this contention by argumg that smce the presence or absence of the heat of passion on i,;udden provoration affect,; only the
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the
trachtional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not subject to rtgorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker,
404 ll . S. 443 (1972) . There is no incompatibility between our de
cision toda,· and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bod1e1:=.
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facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the
defendant
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law
of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has:
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Because the former are less "blameworth[y]," State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they
are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By
drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests
found critical in ·winship.
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have,
been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict
of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when
viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions
of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the distinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could
undermine many of the interests that decision sought to•
Under Maine law, thr jury is given no discretion as to the sentence.
to be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide . If the·
defendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence results. On the other hand, if the jury finds him guilty only of manslaughter it rc.mains for the trial court in the exercise of its
<liscretipn to hnJ?ose a s.entence within the statutorily defined limits...

.'
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protect without effecting any substantive change in its
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear only on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this approach can be fashioned from the
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into three distinct punishment categories-murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these
categories require that the homicidal act either be intentional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670-672 ( concurring opinion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide.
Petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine C'ould impose a
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that
traditionally might be considered involuntary manslaughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.24
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this
kind of formalism. 25 The rationale of that case requires
an analysis that looks to the "operatic,m and effect of the
law as &,pplied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S W
2 4 Many States impose differer..t statutory sentences on different
degrees of assault . If Winship were limited to a State's definition
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the
elements of aggravation-e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob.
But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d .523 (Me. 1969) (prosecution
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency·
was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U. S.,,
at 3.6.5-366 ; id.., at 373-374 (Harlan, J ., concurring),..
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R Co. v. ArkansM, 235 U. S. 350, 362 (1914), and to the

interests of both the State and the defendant as affected
by the allocation of the burden of proof.
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 20
"The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction.
"Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard
is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364.
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this
case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner there
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible
extension of an additional four and one-half years, 397
U S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant
and the community's confidence in the administration of
the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this
case, 21 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in
See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 486 (1972).
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 160 (1968):
"The penalty authorized by the law of thr loeality may be taken
'as a gauge of its social and ethical ,iudgmen1 s.'" Quoting District
of Cot¥mbia ,. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) .
26

27

·.
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Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting) .
Not only are the interests underlying Winship implicated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect·/
the protection afforded thor:ie interests is less here. In
Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained
with the prosecution, although the standard had been reduced to proqf by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result,
where the defendant is required to prove the critical fact
in dispute, is to increase further the likelihood of an
erroneous murder conviction. Such a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in Speiser v. Randall,
357 u. s. 513, 525-526 (1958):
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by
the process of placing on the [prosecution] the
burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the c ~ C>
clusion of the trial. ... "
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) .
C
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145,
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument
that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defendant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prosecution to satisfy. The same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the traditional burden which our system of criminal justice
deems essential.

I
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Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself acknowledged that most States require the prosecution to
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.zs Moreover, the difficulty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v.
Roll'ins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation is similar to proving any other element of
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the
homicide. And although intent is typically considered
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify
shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States,
319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 39·5
u. s. 6, 45 (1969).
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique
in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 2 Maine itself
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millet,
273 A. 2d 504 (1971). 30 Satisfying this burden imposes
1)

28 See p, 12, supra.
Sep ::ilso ote, 38 Mo. L. Rei·. 105 (1973).
Many States do require the defendant to show that there is "some evidence" indicating that he acted 111 the heat of passion before requiring the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of
pa~sion beyond a reasonable doubt. SE'e LaFavr & Austin, supra,
at 539; Prrkins, supra, n. 14, at 50-51. Sec also nn. 16 & 19, snpra .
. Tothmg in this opinion i~ intended to affect thai rrquirement. See
abo n. 30, infra.
20 See generally Wharton , A Tm.1fo,e on thr Law of Evidence § 320
(9th Ed. 1884) , Model PPnnl Code § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, S'Upra, n 16, at 883 & n. 14.
so In Millet the Maine Supreme ,Judicial Court adopted the "majority rult•" rrgnrcling proof of :self-defen~e. The burden of producing ":iome evidence" on this isi:iue rei;t,:; with the defendant, but

;

I,
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a,n obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to

the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique '.1ardship on the prosecution that would justify requirh.g the
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical
to criminal culpability.31

:I£"

Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pas~
the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt remains on the prosecution.
31 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of
cases. Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the
production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instauces,
howevrr, it is aidrd by a presumption, see Davis v. United States,
160 U. S. 469 (1895) (prt'snmption of sanity), or a permissible
inference, see United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S . 6:3 (1965) (inference
of knowledge from presence i,t an illegal still). Thes('. procednrnl
device1, require (in the casr of :1 presumption) or permii (in the case
of a11 inferencr) the trier of fact to concludr that the prosrrution
has met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred
fact by having satisfactorily established other foe:ts . Thus, in effect
thry rPquire the dl'fendant to presen1 somr evidence contesting the
otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. Unit<>d State/$,
412 U . S. 837, 846 n. 11 (197a) . Since they shift the production
burclrn to thC' defendant, these devicf's must satisfy crrtain dur
prorrs:,; n•quirrments. See e. g., Barnes v. United States, S'll]Jra;
Turner v. United ,States, 390 U. S. :398 ( 1970).
In each of these cases, howtwer, thr ultimatr burden of per~uasinn
by proof beyond a reasonablP rioub1 remained on the prosecution.
Se<', e. !7-, Barnes v. United 8tate8, 412 U.S., al 845 11. 9; Davi1J v.
United 8tates, 160 U.S .. :1t 484-488. Shifting the burden of prrwa:,;iorr
to the d<'f Pndant obviously place~ an l'VP!l grratcr strain upon him since
lrn no longer need nnly pre~cn1 ~orne rvidence with respect to the fact
at i:,;suc; he must affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly,
the Due l'roccss Clause demands more exacting standards before
the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of
persuasion. Sefl generall.y Ashford & Risinger, Presumptionf-1, As~
smnptions and Due Process in Criminal Ca&es: A Theoretical Over..

..'"
f

•.

view, 79 Yale L. J.165 (1909),
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sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372
(concurring opinion) . We therefore hold that the Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on
sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented
in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is

Affirmed.

·;
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with
murder' to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule comports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re
Winship, 397 U. S, 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged,

I
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E,
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him
rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's statement, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had
attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homosexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respond...
ent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's
counsel asserted that at most the homicide was man-

.:t
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slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the
heat of passion pr-0voked by the homosexual assault.
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not subdivided into different degrees. The common elements
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionatz
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between
murder and manslaughter.
In view of the evidence the trial court drew particular
attention to the difference between murder and manslaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of
both offenses/ the court charged that "malice aforethought
is an essential and indispensable element of the crime
of murder," App., at 40, withput which the homicide
would be manslaughter. 1'he jury was further instructed,
1 As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court mentioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38.
2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the
jury lo find "either that the defendant intended death, or tl1at he
intended an act which was calculated and should have been under.
stood by [a] person of reason to bP one likely to do great bodily harm
and that death resulted." App., at 37.
3
The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 2651,
provides:
"Whoever unlaw£ully kills a human being with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, is guilty of mmcler and shall be punished
hy imprisonment for life."
The manslaughter statute, Tit. 17, § 2551, in relevant part
provides:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion,
on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought " " . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000
or b_y im1>risomnent for not more than 20 yeara..•."
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however, that if the prosecution establi-shed that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice
aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation! The court emphasized that "malice aforethought
and heat of passion on sudden provocation are inconsistent things," App., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then concluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 6
After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury twice
returned to request further instruction. It first sought
The trial court also explained the concept of express malice afore~
thought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of human life which
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fa.tally bent on mischief." App., at 40, 41. Despite thil;l instruction, the court repeatedly made clear that express malice need not be established since
malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice
appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(1973). See also n. 10, infra.
5 "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the act the
reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irra,.,
tionally without due delibe·t·ation or reflection, and from passion
rather than judgment." App., at 47.
0 "[H]eat of pa~sion will not av'.lil unless upon sudden provocation.
Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief
notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for ... , It
is not every provocation, it is not, every rage of passion t11at will
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation
must be of such a char.acter and so close upon the act of killing,
that for a moment a person could be-that for a mornent the
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own
uiliforstanding." App .. at ,J7-4S.
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reinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice aforethought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion."
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found
respondent guilty of murder.
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, arguing that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the element of malice
aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential
element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the
sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter.
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's de~
cision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this con ten..
tion,7 holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are
not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the sin..
gle generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur,
278 A. 2d 139 (1971). The court further stated
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that
the prosecution could rest on a presumption of implied
malice J:\,forethought and require the defendant to prove
that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provo..
cation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's
trial,8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the application of the Winship principle to a "reductive factor 0
' Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial.
The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d,
at 144.
8 The
Maine court concluded that Winship should not be
applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, howeve,r, tbat -Win.ship should be given complete retroactive effect. Ivan v. Cit11 pf
New York,. 407 U.S. 203 {197.2).
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!Uch as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id.,
at 144-146.
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. Wilbur v. Rol>o
bins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The :District Court ruled
that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter
are distinct offenses, not di:ftetent degrees of a
single offense. 1,he court further held that "[m]alice
aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id,, at 153.
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires thff
prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a res.
so nab le doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
The Court of Appeale for the First Circuit affirmed,
subscribing in general to the District Court's 11nalysi$
and construction of Maine law. Wilbur v. M1.tllaney,
473 F. 2d 943 (1973). Ahhough recognizing that "within
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion
of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at
945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought
with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that
Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(1973), in which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's
view that it was entitled to make an independent deter...
mination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are punishment c~te_gories of the ~i11~Je offeijse of fejonioQ~ ho~
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cide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a feloniouf!
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove thllJt
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in
order to reGeive the lesser penalty prescribed for
manslaughter.9
In view of the Laf!erty decision we granted certiorari
in this case and remanded to the Court of Ap.,
peals for reconsideration. 414 U. S. 1139· (1974). On
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Ju.
dicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the
''substance" of that law, the court found that the presence
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
results in significant differences in the penalties and
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prose ..
cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now
affirm.

....,.
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'\Ye reject at the outset respondent's position that we
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur..
9

The Maine court emphasized that, contra.ry to the view of th,
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforeth0ught connotes
n:> substantive fact (such as premeditation), but rather is solely :,.
policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine
court would require proof of the same element of intent for both
murder and manslaughter, the distinction being that in the latter
ease the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the
defendant to act in the heat of passion. 309 A. 2d, at 670-l>'ZJ!
(concU;ti:ing opinio~.),,.
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der and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and
that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it
marks a radical departure from prior law,10 leads to in..
ternally inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort
to circumvent Winship, This Court, however, repeatedly
has held that state cour~s are the ultimate expositors of
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U, S. 590
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and
that we are bound by their constructions e:,ccept in ex~
treme circum~tarices not present here.11 Accordingly,
Respondent relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347
(1964). In that case a State Supreme Court's reinterpretation of
a criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and there~
fore deprived the defendants of fair potice of the possible criminality
of their acts at the time they were cotnmitted. Thus, the retroactive
application of the new interpretation "as it~elf a denial of due
process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v, HiU, 281
U. S. 673 (1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes,
Respondent's Brief, at 12, there was no comparable prejudice to
respondent since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion
has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See,
e. g., State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11; 137-138 (1857). To be sure, the
trbl court instructed the jury on the concept of express malice
aforethought, see n. 4, 3Upra, a concept tliat, was subsequently
i;tripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme ,Judicial Court. But
the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need
not be shown since malice would be implied from the unlawful homi..
cide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973), we discern no prejudice to
respondent.
11 On rare occasions the Court has re-exo,mined :,. stnte court int.er..
pretation of state law when it appears to be an "obvious subterfuge
to evade ronsideration of a federal issue." Radio Station WOW, ]11£.
v. Joh1'1,6on, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945) . See Ward v. Love Co., 253 U. B.
17 (1920); Terre Haute & Ind. R. R. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketchum,,
l94 U. S, 579 {1904), h1 this case the Maine court's intervretatjon
10
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of state homicide law.

III
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case,
can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse,
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murderi, e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was com.,
mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation,
in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i. e., by
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due
process.

,I

~

Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue fa placed
in historical context.u At early common law only those
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and
were punished by death, Gradually, however, the severity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated.
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justifiable homicides expanded to include, for example, accideptal homicides and those committed in self-defense,
of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate eon.,
sideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recognized, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of
this opinion makes clear. See generally Comment, Due Process and
Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of
Federalism After Wilbur v, Mullaney, ~6 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974),
n Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 197-198 (1971). See also
3 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883);
2 PoJlock & Maitland, History of English Law 478-487 (2g ed. 1909).

.
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Concurrently, the widespread 4se of capital punishment
was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligible for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic juris-,
diction. And under ecclesiastic law person who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th
century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular,
enacted a series of stat'utes eliminating the benefit of
clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 11
U11lawful homicides that were committed without such
malice were designated "manslaughter" and their per..
petrators remained eligible for the benefit of clergy.
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for
all secular offenses the distinction between murder and
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter
(when voluntary)u arises from the sudden heat of pas..
sions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 190. Malice aforethought was
designated as the element that distinguished the two
crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be
implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent
proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden
and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide WR$

a

18 12 Hen. VII, C 7 (1496); 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512); 23 Hen,.
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547).

u Blackstone also referred to a clas;, of homicides called involun.,
tary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in

the course of perpetrating another unlawful, although not felonious,
act. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 192-193. This offense, wi~
some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in
ibis count~y. See Perkins On Cruninal Law 70-'77 (2d ed. 19\39) ,

!:>•
. ·,
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"presumed to be malicious." 15 Id., at 201. In view of
this presumption, the early English authorities, relying
Ori the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB
1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the
accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent
on the prisoner to make out ... all ... circumstances of
justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction
of the court and jury." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries
201. See Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at common law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden
provocation appears to have rested on the defendant.16
In this country the concept of malice aforethought
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it
came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring
the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions
it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that
absent proof to the contrary a, homicide was presumed
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me.1972). See generally
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provoca..
tion it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect,
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally
Note, The Constitutiona.lity of the Common Law Presumption of
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986-099 (1974).
ir; Fletcher, Two Kinds of Ll?gal Rules: A Comparative Study of
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 880,
904-907 (1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance·
on Onerby's case was misplaced. In Onerby the jury returned a
special verdict making specific findings of fact . No finding was
made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the
court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains
that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to deterc•
mine whether the defendant failed to satisfy 11is burdf'n <1f going
forward with "some evid.ence" or the ultimate burden of persuagj;n,g;
:the.jury. See al.son. 20, infr:.a.

,,
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Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934).11 In a landmark case, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) 93
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Su=
preme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to negate malice aforethought by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of
passion.18 Initially, York was adopted in Maine 10 as well
as several other jurisdictions.20 In 1895, however, in
:i7

Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees,
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37
Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937).
18 Justice
Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth
was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, in~
eluding malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate
the suggestion that the killing occured in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. He also rejected t11e doctrine of implied
malice on the ground that "[n]o malice can oo inferred from the
mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and
unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128.
19 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857).
20
· See cases cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79.
Some
confusion developed, however, 1s to precisely what Y orlc required.
Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof"
into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular
issue and a, burden of perstuiding the fact finder with respect to that
issue by a standard such as proof beyond. a reasonable doubt or by
a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., McCormick, Evidence § 336 (2d <'d. 1972) . This distinction apparently was nt>t
well recognized at the time York was decided, and thus in some
jurisdictions it was 1mclear whether the defendant was required. to
bear the production bnrden or the persuasion burden 011 the issue
of heat of passion. See, e. g., cases discussed in People v. Morrin,
31 Mich. App. 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971).
Indeed, 10 years after the decision iu York, Chief Justice Shaw
explained that "the doctrine of York's case was that where the ki11ing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing
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the context of deciding a question of federal criminal pro-cedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously
rejected the general approach articulated in York. Dav-is
v. United States, 160 U. S. 469. 21 And, in the past half
century, the large majority of States have abandoned
York and now require the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond
a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, Criminal Law
530-540 ( 1972). 22
This historical review establishes two important points.
First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been,
almost from the inception of the common law of homifurther is shown, the prest:mption of law is that it was malicious
and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (69
Mass.) 463, 465 (1855) (emphasis in original). He further noted
that this presumption did not govern when there was evidence
indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion.
In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with
malice, they will return a verdict of murder; otherwise they will find
the defendant guilty of manslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus , even
the author of York quickly limited its scope to require only that
the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is,
that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other
jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by
requiring the defendant to prove "to the satisfaction of the jury"
that he acted in the heat of passion. See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63
N. C. 26 (1868).
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court declined
to apply the, specific holding of Davis-that the prosecution must
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt-to the State••
22 See also State v. Cuevas, 480 P. 2d 322 (Hawaii 1971) (Win.~hip
requires the prosecution to prove malir,e aforethought beyond a
reasonable doubt) . England also now requires the prosecution to
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mancini v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1942 Ap.
Cas. 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1935 Ap~

Cf.ls. 462.•
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cide, the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 1G; Packer,
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968) .

B
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations
Winship should not be extended to the present case.
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact
necessary to constitut,e the crime" of felonious homicide
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to petitioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were essential 'to establish criminality in the first instance
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play
until the jury already has determined that the defendant
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter.
In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of
paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or
absence of the heat of pMsion on sudden provocation, he
is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigmatized. zs In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those
Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 1&1, 196 (1971), petitioners seek
to buttress this contention by arguing that since the prC'sence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the
traditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not sub•
ject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker,
404 U. S. 443 (1972) . There is no incompatibility between our decision today and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bodies,
28
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facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the
defendant
This anal,vsis fails to recognize that the criminal law
of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Beca use the former are less "blameworth [y] ," State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they
are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By
drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests
found critical in Win.ship.
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have
been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict
of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when
viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions
of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the dis..
tinction established by Maine between murder and man..
slaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could
undermine many of the interests that decision sought to
Und<'r .Maine law the jury is given no discretion aec to the sentence
to be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide. If the
defendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence resu1ts. On the other ud, if the jury finds him guilty only of man.
slaughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise .of it&
discretion to impose a sentence within the 1tatutorily defined limjt~,

'.

'14-13-0PINION

MULLANEY v. WILBUR

15

protect without effecting any substantive change in its
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as f actors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this approach can be fashioned from the
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into three distinct punishment categories-murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these
categories require that the homicidal act either be intentional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670-672 ( concurring opinion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide,
See petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, th ey bear only
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that
traditionally might be considered involuntary mansla1.t6hter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.H
Wins hip is concerned with substance rather than this
kind of formalism.25 The rationale of that case requires
an analysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the
law as a,pplied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S W
Many States impose different statutory sentences on different
degrees of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the
elements of aggravation-e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob.
But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d 523 (Me. 1969) (prosecution
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt) .
25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency
was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U. S,.
at 365-366; id ,, at 373-374 (Harlan, J ., concurrmg) .
24

l
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R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362 ( 1914), and to the
interest..c;; of both the State and the defendant as affected
by the allocation of the burden of proof.
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26
61
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction.

~'Moreover, use of the -reasonable-doubt standard
is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364.
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this
case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner tp.ere
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible
extension of an additional four and one-half years, '397
U. S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant
and the community's confidence in the administration of
the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this:
case/7 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in
See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 486 (1972).
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S, 145, 160 (1968):
"The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken
'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.' " Quoting Di.~tricft
Qj Colu11ibia v. Clawans, 3JJO U. S. 617, 628 (1937).
26

27
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Winship was "benevolent'' in intention, seeking to provide
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treat•
ment." In re WinBhip, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting) .
Not only are the interests underlying Winship implicated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect
the protection afforded those interests is less here. In
Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained
with the prosecution, although the standard had been reduced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result,
in a case such as this one where the defendant is required
to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase further
the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such
a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958):
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-th [e] margin of error is reduced as to him by
the process of placing on the [prosecution] the
burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial. ..."
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
C
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145,
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument
that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defendant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prosecution to satisfy. The same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the tra-,
ditional burden which our system of criq.1inal justice
deems essential.

,
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Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself ac~
lmowledged that most States require the prosecution to
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.is Moreover, the difficulty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation is similar to proving any other element of
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the
homicide. And although intent is typically considered
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify
shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States,
319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 39·5
u. s. 6, 45 (1969).
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique
in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 211 Maine itself
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millet,
273 A. 2d 504 (1971).~0 Satisfying this burden imposes

)

'
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:.s See p . 12, supra. See also Note, 38 Mo . L. Rev. 105 (1973) .
Many States do require the defendant to show that there is "some evi~
dence" indicating that he acted in the heat of passion before requir~
ing the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of
pai:;sion beyond a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, supra,,.
at 539, Perkins, supra, n 14, at 50-51. See also nn. 16 & 20, supra.
Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement . See
also n. 30, infra.
29 See genernlly Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence§ 320'
{9th ed. 1884); Model Penal Cude § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent .
Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, s,upra, n. 16, at 883 & n . 14.
so In Millet the Maine Supreme Judicial. Courl adopted the "ma.~
jority rule" reg:uding proof of self-defense. The burden of pro~
d~cing ",some evidence" on this issue rest1< with the defendant, but

'
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an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to
the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hardship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical
to criminal culpability.31

IV
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pasthe ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt remains on the prosecution.
31 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of
cases, Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the
production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instances,
however, it is aided by a presumption, see Davis v. United States,
160 U. S. 469 (1895) (presumption of sanity), or a permissible
inference, see United States v. Gainey, 3~ U.S. 63 (1965) (inference
of knowledge from presence at a'n ill~gal still). These procedural
devices require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (iu the case
of an inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution
has met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred
fact by having satisfactorily established other frets. Thus, in effect
they require the defendant to present some evidence contesting the
otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. United States,
412 U. S. 837, 846 n. 11 (1973). Since they shift the production
burden to the defendant, these devices must satisfy certain due
process requirements. See e. g., Barnes v. United Stotcs, s1tpra;
T1trne~ v. United States, :396 U. S. 398 (1970).
In each of these cases, however , the ultnnnte burden of persuasion
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remained on the prosecution.
See, e. g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S., at 845 n. 9; Davis v.
United States, 160 U. S., at 484-488. Shifting i he burden of persuasion
to the defendant obviously places an even greater strain upon him since
ho no longer need only present. some evidence with respect to the fact
at issue; he must affirhiatively establish that fact. Accordingly,
the Due Process Clause demands more exacting standards before
the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of
persuasion. See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Ase
sumptions and Due Procesi; in Criminal CasEJs: A Theoretical Over~
view8 79 Yale L. J. 165 (1969).
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sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder
to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defend•
ant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indi•
cates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a sig•
nificantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372
( concurring opinion) . We therefore hold that the Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on
sudden provocation wheh the issue is properly presented
in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is

Affirmed.

MR. JusTrCE DouGLAS took no part in the consideration /
or decision of this case.

NOTE: Where It le feasible, a syllabus (headnote) wUl be released, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See Untted States v. Detrott Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 821, S,87,
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The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder, which
upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment,
to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation
in order to reduce the homiride to manslaughter, in which case the
punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years.
Held: The Maine rule does not comport with the requirement of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358. To satisfy that requirement the prosecution in a homicide
case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is
properly presented. Pp. 8-20.
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POWELL,

QUIST,

NOTICE : Thi • opinion fl • ubject to formal rnl •ton before pubtlcatloa
In the prellmlnar;y print of the United States Reporte . Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20:143, of an;y typographical or other
formal errorei In order that correctlon1 may be made before the prellmlnar;y prin goea to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-13
Garrell S. Mullaney
et al., Petitioners,

v.
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

,[June 9, 1975]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to
manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule comports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re
Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged.

I
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E.
Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him
rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude
Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's statement, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had
attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homo.
sexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but
argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respondent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's
®Unsel ass.erted that at most the h.omicide was man-
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slaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the
heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault.
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine
law recognizes only two kinds of homicide, murder
and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not sub.
divided into different degrees. The common elements
of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i. e., neither
justifiable nor excusable 1-and that it be intentionati
The prosecution is required to prove these elements by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are
so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between
murder and manslaughter.
In view of the evidence the trial court drew particular
attention to the difference between murder and manslaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of
both offenses,3 the court charged that "malice aforethought
is an essential and indispensable element of the crime
of murder," App., at 40, without which the homicide
would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed,
1 As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court men•
'tioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and
an individual acting in self-defense. App., at 38.
·2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the
jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he
intended an act ,vhich was calculated and should have been understood by [a] person of reason to be one likely to do great bodily harm
and that death resulted:" App., at 37.
a The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 17, § 265-1,
provides:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a ·human being with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished
'by imprisonment for life:"
The manslaughter statute, Tit. 17, § 2551, in relevant part
provides:
"Whoever unlawfully ·kills a ·human being in the heat of passion,
on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice afore,.
· thought . . . shall ·be punished ·by a fine of not more than $1,001)
,or by imprisonment for -not mqre than -20 years . .• /'
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however, that if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice
aforethought Was to be conclusively implied unless the
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought
and heat of passion on sudden provocation are inconsistent things," App., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the
defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then concluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of
passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 6
After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury twice
returned to request further instruction. It first sought
• The trial court also explained the concept of express malice afore.
thought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby
manifesting "a general malignancy and disregard of human life which
proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally bent. on mis•
chief." App., at 40, 41. Despite this instruction, the court repeatedly made clear that express malice need not be established since
malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted
in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice
appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(1973). See also n. 10, infra.
5 "Heat of passion . .. me.ans that at the time of the act the
reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might
[make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irra.
tionally without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion
rather than judgment." App., at 47.
0 "[H]eat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation.
Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief
notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for . . . . It
is not every provocation, it is not every rage of passion that will
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation
must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing,
that for a moment a person could be-that for a moment the
defendant could be considered as not being the master of his ow9
understanding." App., at 47-48.
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Teinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice afore;.
thought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion.'i
Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found
respondent guilty of murder.
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, arguing that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the element of malice
aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat
' of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that
under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential
' element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the
sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter,
Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's decision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the
existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention,7 holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are
not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the sin..
gle generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur,
'278 A. 2d 139 (1971) . The court further stated
that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that
the prosecution could ·rest on a presumption of implied
malice aforethoug11t and require the defendant to prove
'that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provo. cation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With
respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's
' ·trial, 8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the appli' cation of the Winship principle to a "reductive factor"
-r Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial.
·The Maine Supreme Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable
on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." 278 A. 2d,
at 144.
8 The
Maine court concluded that Winship should not be
applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, however, that Win.
ship should be given complete retroactive effect. -Ivan v. City of
-New :Yotk, 407 U. S. 203 (1972).
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~uch as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Id.,
at 144-146.
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. Wilbur v. Rob;
bins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court ruled
that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter
are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a
single offense. The court further held that "[m]alice
aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the
offense of murder, and it is explicitly excluded as an
element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153.
Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the
prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a rea·sonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied
malice which requires the defendant to prove that he
itcted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
The Court of Appea·1s for the First Circuit affirmed,
subscribing in general to, the District Court's analysis
and construction of Ma:lne law. Wilbur v. Mullaney,
473 F. 2d 943 ( 1973). Although recognizing that "within
·broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its
own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally
unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion
of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at
'945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought
with "premeditation," id., at '947, and concluded that
Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial
'Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647
(1973), in which it sha1rply disputed the Fi:rst Circuit's
•view that it was entitled to make an independent detere
•mination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed
its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are punish·ment categories of thEt single offense of felo 1nious homi-

•
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cide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a felonious
homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in
order to receive · the lesser penalty prescribed for
manslaughter.1'
In view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari
in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. ·414 U. S. 1139 (1974). On
remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to
the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Ju.
dicial Court. 496 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the
"substance" of that law, the court found that the presence
or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
results in significant differences in the penalties and
stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the
Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in
Winship control, and that to establish murder the prose•
' cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now
affirm.

II
We reject at the outset respondent's position that we
follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial
opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that mur•
11 The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to the view of the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforethought connotes
no substantive fact. (such as premeditation), but rather is solely a
policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine
court would require proof of the same element of intent for botl.t
murder and manslaughter, the distinction being that in the latte,r
case the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the
defendant to act in the heat of passion. 309 A. 2d, at 670-671
·(concurring opinion).
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der and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and
that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former
and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state
law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it
marks a radical departure from prior law, 10 leads to in•
ternally inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort
to circumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of
state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 590
(1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and
that we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances not present here. 11 Accordingly,
Respondent relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347
(1964). In that case a State Supreme Court's reinterpretation of
a. criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and therefore deprived the defendants of fair notice of the possible criminality
of their acts at the time they were committed. Thus, the retroactive
application of the new interpretation was itself a denial of due
process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hil,l, 281
U. S. 673 (1930). In this case, as 1'espondent apparently concedes,
Respondent's Brief, at 12, there was no comparable prejudice to
respondent since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion
bas rested on the defendant for more than a century. See,
e.g., State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 , 137-138 (1857). To be sure, the
trial court instructed the jury on the concept of express malice
aforethought, see n. 4, supra, a concept that was subsequently
stripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. But
the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need
not be shown since malice would be implied from the unlawful homicide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973), we discern no prejudice to
respondent.
11 On rare occasions the Court bas re-examined a state court interpretation of state law when it appears to be an "obvious subterfuge
to evade consideration of a federal issue." Radio Station WOW, Inc.
,v.Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 129 (1945) . See Wardv. Love Co., 253 U.S.
17 (1920); Terre Ho:ute & Ind. R. R . v. Indiana ex rel. Ketchum:,
194 U. S. 579 (1904). In this case the Maine court's interpretation
10
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we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of state homicide law.

III
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case;
can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse,
all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious
homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murderi. e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation,
in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i. e., by
a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to
exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule
requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation accords with due
process.

'A
Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue is placed
in historical context. 12 At early common law only those
homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were
,considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and
were punished by death. Gradually, however, the severity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated.
Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justifiable homicides expanded to include, for example, accidental homicides and those committed in self-defense.
of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate consideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recognized, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of
this opinion makes dear. See generally Comment, Due Process and
Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of
Federalism After Wilbur v. Mull,finey, 26 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974) .
12 Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 197-198 (1971) . See also,
3 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883);
2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 478-487 (2d ed. 1909).

.,

'•
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Concurrently, the widespread use of capital punishment
was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic
jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligible for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that
effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic juris-diction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he
received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and
was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th
century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of
ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular,
enacted a series of statutes eliminating the benefit of
clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 13
Unlawful homicides that were committed without such
malice were designated "manslaughter" and their per..
petrators remained eligible for the benefit of clergy.
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for
·all secular offenses the distinction between murder and
manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter
(when voluntary) 14 mises 'liram ihe sudden heat of pas,.,
sions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries Hm. Malice aforethought was
designated as the relement that distinguished the two
crimes, but it was 'recognized that such malice could be
implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent
proof that 1tn ·unlawful 'homicide resulted from "sudden
'and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide was
is 12 Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496) ; 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512); 23 Hen.
VIII, C. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1"531); 11 Etlw. VI, C. 12, § 10 (1547).
14 Blackstone also ,yeferrecl to a class of homicides called involuntary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in
the course of perpetrating another unlawful, although not felonious,
act. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 192-193. This offense, with
some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in
1this country. See Perkins On Criminal Law 70-77 (2d ed. 1969),
1

•
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"presumed to be malicious." 16 Id., a.t 201. In view o/
this presumption, the early English authorities, relying
on the case of The King v. Onerby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (KB
1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the
accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent
on the prisoner to make out ... all ... circumstances of
justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction
of the court and jury." 4 Blackstone's Commentarie!!l
201. See Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at common law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden
provocation appears to have rested on the defendant.1 d
In this country the concept of malice aforethought
took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it
came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring
the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions
it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that
absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed
not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me.1972). See generally
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought
was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provocation it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect,
Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally
Note, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of
Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. ilev. '973, '986-999 (1974).
16 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of
·Burden-of-Persuasion ·Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 880,
904-907 ( 1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance
on Onerby's case was misplaced. fo Onerby the jury returned a
special verdict making specific findings of fact. No finding was
made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the
court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains
that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to deter·mine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of goingforward with "some evidence" or the ultimate burden of persuading:
·the jury. See also n. 20, infra.
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Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934).n In a landtnark case, Commonwealth v. -York, 9 Met. (50 Mass.) 93
(1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to negate malice aforethought by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of
passion. 18 Initially, York was adopted in Maine 10 as well
as several other jurisdictions.20 In 1895, however, in
17 Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees,
typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and
requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation .in
order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of 'Murder, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759
(1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37
Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937).
18 Justice
Wilde dissented, arguing that · the Commonwealth.
was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, including malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate
the suggestion that the killing occured in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. He also rejected the doctrine of implied
malice on the ground that "[n]o malice can be inferred from the
mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and
unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128.
19 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857).
20 See cases cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79.
Some
confusion developed, however, as to precisely what Yor'c required.
Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof''
into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular
issue and a burden of persuading the fact finder with respect to that
issue by a standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by
a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., McCormick, Evi.
dence § 336 (2d ed. 1972'). This distinction apparently was not
well recognized at the time -York was decided, and thus in some
jurisdictions it was unclear whether the defendant was required to
·bear the production burden or t1ie persuasion burden on the issue
of heat of passion. See, e. g., cases discussed in People v. Morrin,
31 Mich. App. 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971).
Indeed, 10 years after the decision in York, Chief Justice Shaw
explained that "the doctrine of York's case was that where the kill·ing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing
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the context of deciding a question of federal criminal procedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously
rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis
v. United States, 160 U. S. 469. 21 And, in the past halt
century, the large majority of States have abandoned
York and now require the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond
a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, Criminal Law
.
539-540 (1972). 22
This historical review establishes two important points.
First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been,
almost from the inception of the common law of homifurther is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious
and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (69
Mass.) 463, 465 (1855) (emphasis in original) . He further noted
that this presumption did not govern when there was evidence
indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion.
In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with
-malice, they will return a verdict of murder ; otherwise they will find
the defendant guilty of manslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus, even
the author of York quickly 'limited its scope to require only that
·the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is,
·that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other
jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by
requiring the defendant to prove "to the sa.tisfaction of the jury''
that he acted in the 'heat of ·passion. See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63
N. C. 26 (1868).
21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 190 (1952), the Court declined
to apply the specific holding of Davis-that the prosecution must
·prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt-to the States.
22 See also State v. Cuevas, 480 P. 2d 322 ('Hawaii 1971) (Winship
requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a
't'easonable doubt). England also -now requires the prosecution to
negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a
-reasonable doubt. Mancini v. 1Jir. of ·Public -Prosecutions, 1942 Ap.
Cas. 1; see Woolmington v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, 1935 Ap.
1C~~2.
.

,.
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cide, the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving
this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; Packer,
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968).

B
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the
State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations
Winship should not be extended to the present case.
They note that as a formal matter the absence of the
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact
necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide
in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis
supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to petitioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were essential to establish criminality in the first instance
whereas the fact in question here does not come into play
until the jury already has determined that the defendant
is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter.
In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's
critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of
paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or
absence of the heat of pa~sion on sudden provocation, he
is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigmatized. 23 In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those
Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 196 (1971), petitioners seelf;
to buttress this contention by arguing that since the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the
extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the
traditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not subject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker,
404 U. S. 443 (1972). There is no incompatibility between our decision today and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bodies.
23

14-i3-6i>fNf6N
14

MULLANEYv. WILBUR

facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate th~
defendant
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law
of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned
not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also
with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has
chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion
from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Be..
cause the former are less "blameworth [y] ," State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they
are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By
drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests
found critical in Winship.
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavail.,
ing simply because a determination may already have
been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal
liberty. The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict
,of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when
viewed in terms of the potentia1 difference in restrictiong
of personal liberty attendan-t to each conviction, the dis..
tinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.
Moreover, if Winship were 1imited to those facts that
constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could
undermine many of the inter€sts that decision sought toUnder Maine law the jury :is given no discretion as to the sentenceto be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide. If the
defendant is found to ·be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence results. On the other ·hand, ,if the jury finds him guilty only of manslaughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise of its
, discretion to impose a .sentence within the statutorily defined limi~ ..
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protect without effecting any substantive change in its
law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements
that comprise different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this approach can be fashioned from the
law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into three distinct punishment categories-murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these
categories require that the homicidal act either be intentional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See
State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 670-672 ( concurring opinion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not
general elements of the crime of felonious homicide.
See Petitioners' Brief, at 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only
on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a
life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that
traditionally might be considered involuntary manslaughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his
act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless. 26
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this
kind of formalism. 25 The rationale of that case requires
an analysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the
law as applied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S W
2• Many States impose different statutory sentences on different
degrees of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition
of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults
as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the
elements of aggravation-e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob.
But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d 523 (Me. 1969) (prosecutio~
must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
:u Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of
proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency
was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U. S •.,
a.t 365-366; id., at 373-374 (Harlan, J ., concurring).
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R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914), and to the
interests of both the State and the defendant as affected
by the allocation of the burden of proof.
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26
"The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure
for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction.
"Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard
is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned." 397 U. S., at 363, 364.
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this
case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner there
faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible
extension of an additional four and one-half years, 397
U. S., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differen•
tial in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a man•
datory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant
and the community's confidence in the administration of
the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this:
case,:n since the adjudication of delinquency involved in
See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 486 (1972) .
See Duncan v. Louisiana., 391 U . S. 145, 160 (1968) :
"The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken
'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.' " Quoting District;
of Columbia, v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 628 (1937) .
26

27

,..
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Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide
"a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 376 (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting) .
Not only are the interests underlying Winship implicated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect
the protection afforded those interests is less here. In
Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained
with the prosecution, although the standard had been reduced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result,
in a case such as this one where the defendant is required
to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase further
the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such
a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525-526 (1958) :
"[W]here one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-th[e] margin of error is reduced as to him by
the process of placing on the [prosecution] the
burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the con•
clusion of the trial. . , ."
See also In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 370-372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
C
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145,
that because of the difficulties in negating an argument
that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion
the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defend.
ant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prose•
cution to satisfy. The same may be said of the require.
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many con•
troverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the tra.
ditional burden which our system of criminal justice
deems essential.
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Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itseti acknowledged that most States require the prosecution to
prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146.zs Moreover, the difficulty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in
Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective
rather than a subjective behavioral criterion." State v.
Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation is similar to proving any other element of
intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the
factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the
homicide. And although intent is typically considered
a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify
shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States,
·319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 395
u. s. 6, 45 (1969).
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique
'in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 211 Maine itself
requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self..
·defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millet,
273 A. 2d 504 (1971). 80 Satisfying this burden imposes

.

.

28 See p. 12, supia. See also Note, 38 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1973).
Many States do require tbe defendant to snow that there is "some evi..
dence" indicating that he acted in the heat of passion before requiring the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of
passion beyond a reasonable doubt. See LaFave & Austin, supra,
at 539; Perkins, supra, n. 14, at 50-51. See also nn. 16 & 20, supra.
Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement. See
,also n. 30, infra.
29 See generally Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 320
(9th ed. 1884); Model Penal Code § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 883 & n. 14.
so In Millet t.he Maine Supreme Judicial Court adopted the "majority rule" regarding proof of self-defense. The burden of pro•
.ducing "some evidence" on this issue rests with the defendant, but

.,
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an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to
the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on
sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hardship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the
defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical
to criminal culpability.31

IV
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a pre..ponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pasthe ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a. reasonable
doubt remains on the prosecution.
81 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of
cases. Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the
production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instances,
however, it is aided by a presumption, see Davi'8 v. United States,
160 U. S. 469 (1895) (presumption of sanity), or a permissible
inference, see United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (inference
of knowledge from presence at an illegal still). These procedural
devices require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (in the case
of an inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution
lias met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred
fact by having satisfactorily established other facts. Thus, in effect
they require the defendant to present some evidence contesting the
otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. United States,
412 U. S. 837, 846 n. 11 (1973) . Since they shift the production
burden to the defendant, tl1ese devices must satisfy certain due
process requirements. See e. g., Barnes v. United States, supra;
Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. '398 (1970).
In each of these cases, however, tl1e ultimate burden of persuasion
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remaiued on the prosecution.
See, e. g., Barnes, v. United States, 412 U. S., at 845 n. 9; Davis v.
-United States, 160 U.S., at 484-488. Shifting the burden of persuasioo
to the defendant obviously places an even greater strain upon him since·
·he no longer need only present some evidence wit.h respect to the fact
a.t issue; he must affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly,
the Due Process Clause demands more exacting standards before
the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of
·persuasion. See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases : A Theoretical Overview, 19 Yale L. J. 165 (1969) .
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sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder

to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result
in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as
a, murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser
crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 372
( concurring opinion). We therefore hold that the Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on
sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented
in a, homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is

Affirmed.

